Dr Proles Social Sciences

Introduction

‘The conception of an International Criminal Court is a striking example of the postmodern breakdown of the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs. In the postmodern world, raison d'ètat and the amorality of Machiavelli's theories of statecraft, which defined international relations in the modern era, have been replaced by a moral consciousness that applies to international relations as well as to domestic affairs: hence the renewed interest in what constitutes a just war’ (Cooper, 2002).

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether Just war theory in its present form is appropriate and comprehensive enough in a world, where post- modern, modern and pre-modern states all come together in the form of global institutions. A world engaged in a War on Terror.
How does Just War theory function in a world where coalitions of nation states are engaged in conflict against groups who operate within the sovereign territory of others and are labelled as terrorists? This is the type of warfare that has recently become known as War on Terror. What we have witnessed with regard to Just War Theory are attempts by nation states to make actions fit rules as opposed to rules governing actions that are about to be taken. So we examine if the contemporary act of globalisation in conjunction with changing methods of war requires a new Just War Theory?
There have been many books and articles written since the events of Sept 11th on this subject area, from many different political and ideological perspectives among them Cooper (2002), Mileham (2004), Elshtain (2003), Simpson (2001), Cook (2001) and Walzer (2004).
Post-modern warfare is a different beast to traditional war between nation states. It is armies of Nation states engaged in conflict with terrorist groups, these can be stateless groups e.g. Al-Qaeda. Or groups who are acting in what they perceive to be the interests of their state, which use terrorist tactics to further their aims e.g. the Palestine Liberation Organisation, the Basque separatists or the Irish paramilitary organisations. Nation states are signatories to treaties and conventions that govern their conduct with regards to both waging war and conduct in war e.g. The Geneva Conventions and their protocols. They are thus bound by their terms and conditions. They also have obligations after war, reparations and duties to the states on whose territory the war has taken place. The terrorist groups are not bound by any such obligations although they claim to fight for a Just Cause, such as a religious or a political goal.

Since September the 11th 2001, politicians, the media, the general public and organisations such as the United Nations, Amnesty International and the Red Cross have subjected the actions of the coalition forces led by the USA to scrutiny. Just War theory is recognised by many nation states as being a standard by which a war can be measured in terms of it being Just or unjust - the widespread use of just war theory by both Western countries and the international community can be seen in the use of just war theory by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. The Nuremberg tribunal used the basic just war categories to determine if the actions taken by the Axis powers were in accord with international law, (Telford Taylor (1992), Rostow (1995)). The armies that form the coalition forces can therefore be held accountable for their actions. But by whose criteria can the groups referred to as terrorists, be held accountable? These groups are not signatories to conventions or treaties. The laws of an individual nation state do not bind them, neither do international laws, they therefore become pariahs. We must therefore look to international institutions to provide a solution to this problem, to form laws for war and laws in war that will govern not only the actions of nation states, but also the actions of terrorists. Terrorist groups will either disappear or reach a stage where they will want respect from the international community, to form a dialogue with them, this must only be granted on condition that the terrorist groups behave in accordance with the international agreements. Global organisations have a duty to the global community to ensure that any new Just War theory or any alterations of the existing Just War Theory take account of inter-cultural differences in what constitutes moral behaviour. They have a duty to provide clear concise rules that are strictly adhered to, non-compliance by any group or nation must incur sanctions: Such as the threat of the mobilisation of a truly Global Military force against rogue states or groups who ignore International laws for both waging war and conduct in war.

Currently nation states are faced with a dilemma when dealing with terrorist organisations, do they abide by the terms and conditions that they are signatories to and engage in what is considered moral warfare, or should they abandon any attempt to fight a moral war according to Jus ad Bellum or Jus in bello.

A simple definition of terrorism is the deliberate targeting of non-combatants with the intention to injure or kill i.e. Assault or Murder in criminal terminology. Other definitions include ‘the systematic use of violence as a means to intimidate or coerce societies or governments’, (Princeton University, 2001), and
‘ The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological’, (US Department of Defence, 2003).

There are two major methods in which a state can wage war on terrorist groups, neither method is exclusive, operations against terrorist groups can consist of both methods, one preceding the other or both happening simultaneously. In the first method the opposition to the terrorist may be a state sanctioned force that consists of under cover operatives from the intelligence agencies together with Special Forces such as the SAS, SBS and Navy Seals, a combination of military specialists and intelligence operatives. Such operations will invariably operate undercover against prime targets and/or engage in propaganda type actions. This type of engagement can be to encourage the civilian population among whom the terrorists are hiding to assist in tackling the problem, by providing names and locations or by rising up against the terrorists themselves, with support from the West given in the form of money, arms, munitions, intelligence and technology. Shaw (2001) refers to scenarios such as this as risk transfer militarism because such actions transfer risk from the western forces to civilian or military allies.

Nation States may also choose to engage in direct military conflict with terrorist organisations using armies this however is problematic. Firstly in order to engage terrorist groups invasion of a territory is necessary. This means that currently nation states must show just cause for invading a nation state. If the nation state can show just cause they are then faced with another problem; legitimate combatants representing a state or states in the form of identifiable uniformed armies fighting groups that are not easily defined as combatants. Terrorist groups are unstructured in terms of a clearly identifiable command structure and undistinguishable from the general civilian population. Therefore unless proof exists of the status of the individual as a combatant as opposed to a civilian, any attack on that person can be construed as an act of terrorism by the invading nation state. It is for this reason that the British Army, engaged in peacekeeping duties in Northern Ireland, was careful to be seen to be acting in support of the police force, as opposed to engaging in a direct military conflict with the terrorist organisations. The British Government recognised that engaging in war with domestic terrorist organisations was fraught with legal and moral difficulties and thus chose to give the regional forces of law military support.(S.McGonigal, 2005)

Chapter 1
JUST WAR THEORY

A "just war" is hospitable to every self-deception on the part of those waging it, none more than the certainty of virtue, under whose shelter every abomination can be committed with a clear conscience.
(Cockburn, A. 1991)

Just War theory is a theory that has its foundations in our sense of morality. It is significant in that it purports to represent what people collectively agree is moral behaviour in a situation that most people find immoral. Von Clausewitz (1832) describes war as being the continuation of politics by other means. Walzer (2004) argues that the reverse is also true; politics is the continuation of war by other means. We can therefore make the assumption that what exists is a constant state of warfare in one form or another. In the state of politics the combatants are those with power and those without power, the state versus the people, this suggests that in the state of politics there is a need for limits and controls on state power, rules that provide just treatment of the citizens of the state. We see such protections for the citizens of states in the form of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, The Constitution of the United States and the proposed EU Constitution. Jus ad bellum is a rational continuation of limiting state power, rules that are considered ethical grounds for the transition from the state of politics to the state of war and vice versa. Jus in bello places limits on state power during war, affording rights to both combatants and civilians. If the old maxim ‘all’s fair in love and war’ were true, the existence of mankind would be a very Hobbesian one indeed.

Morality itself is often referred to as a sense, yet it is not a sense in the way in which sight, sound, touch and taste are senses. A sense of morality is ingrained in the human psyche through the processes of rationalisation, reasoning and socialisation. As human beings we are constantly making moral judgements, what is the right course of action and what is the wrong one. What is fair and what is unfair? What are the consequences of our actions? What are our intentions? We learn to do this from a very early age, even very young children have a sense of justice. Justice in this sense is not justice in the legal definition of the term, but a subjective notion of fair and unfair acts that are done to us, for us, by us, or against us. Therefore it is a natural extension of this sense of justice that has, over centuries of debate and philosophical reasoning, led to Just War Theory as we recognise it today.

Many of those who philosophised and deliberated over the moral questions concerning what is just or unjust in war lived centuries ago, (Cicero (106-43BC), Augustine of Hippo (354-430AD), St Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274AD), Sun Tzu (6th century BC), Hugo Grotius (1583-1645AD) and Karl Von Clausewitz (1780-1831)). The social and political world was presumably vastly different to this world, which we in the 21st century recognise. The weapons at mans disposal and the methods of warfare differ greatly from those of the past. However the Just War Theory conventions remain virtually unchanged from the moral philosophies contained in the works of Aquinas’ Summa Theologica.

Aquinas gave us a just war theory that consisted of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello . We see Jus in Bello today in the form of The Hague and Geneva Conventions and their protocols. These laws are designed to minimize the destruction of life and property, to proscribe cruel treatment of non-combatants and prisoners of war and to establish conditions under which the belligerents may consult with one another. To mitigate the effects of insurrections and civil wars, established governments often recognize the belligerency of domestic opponents and conduct conflicts with them according to the laws of war.
The term Just War, as we recognise it, was not coined until the 1940s, when there was a concerted international effort to limit the conduct of war to actions that could be considered moral. Early Just War theories stem from the teachings of the Catholic Church and therefore are reasoned according to Christian teachings. These early theories were the result of Christians attempting to reason about the morality of waging war at all and the morality of actions once engaged in war. There also appears to be consideration given to Jus post Bello .

Moral reason takes the form of three distinct categories, those based on the acceptance of knowledge stemming from a higher power, Monotheistic moral reasoning and Utilitarianism and Deontological moral reasoning .

Monotheistic moral reason

For Aquinas and Augustine all morality stemmed from the word of one God as taught by the Holy Roman Catholic Church. The Christian concepts of Good and Evil played a large part in their reasoning and rationalisation of what makes a Just War. It can perhaps be argued that this theocratic style of Catholic politics in the middle ages was not so different from the theocracies of Islam that we see today in the middle east, where all knowledge and morality is deemed to stem from God and is divulged to the followers of Islam through the Mullahs and Ayatollahs. In Christian writings there is a distinction made between what is considered Just and Unjust in relation to war. According to Elshtain (2003) ‘this distinction does not exist in Islamic writings’, (Elshtain, 2003, p131). She highlights the contradictions between the ‘Islamic warriors code of honor and the Christian soldiers sense of justice’ (Elshtain, 2003,p131). Arguably the Qu’ran does make distinctions between what is considered Just and Unjust in warfare, it states clearly the actions that should be taken in war between two sets of combatants and makes a distinction between the classifications of combatants, believers, unbelievers and those who are repentant .

The most surprising difference between the biblical and Qu’ranic writings is in relation to killing itself; thou shalt not kill (Biblical) versus do not kill except in a just cause (Qu’ranic). Christian writers such as Aquinas recognised that thou shalt not kill meant that it was never moral for Christians to engage in war and thus set about working out how and when it is moral to disobey the biblical commandment, his deliberations led him to a set of Just Causes. Islamic writers have no such need to discover when it is moral to break the Qu’ranic commandment; it is there in the religious text, a Just Cause is the moral criteria for killing, the very same result of the deliberations of Aquinas. The Qu’ran is not specific about what apart from Islam itself is considered a Just Cause and is therefore ambiguous in its meaning. This is probably why there is a common perception among westerners that Islamic fundamentalists do not abide by a moral code. Wuthnow (1998) compares the Moslem Modernist interpretation of Jihad to Just War Theory, he argues that
‘A war is jihad, only if it is fought in defence of Muslim lives, property, and honor…the modernists are motivated less by Western criticisms of jihad than by the desire to interpret this concept in a way compatible with modern international norms. Jihad in the modernist view is the Islamic equivalent of the Western idea of just war, a war fought to repel aggression with limited goals and by restricted means,’ (Wuthnow (1998).

Wuthnow (1998) summarises the rules of this as

Right Conduct – No war was a jihad unless authorized and led by the imam, the leader of the Islamic state.
Fair warning- Enemies were to be given fair warning, and, should they choose not to accept Islam or to fight, they were to be offered protected (dhimmi ) status.
Non-combatants – were not to be killed.
Enemy property- was not to be destroyed unnecessarily.
Stricter rules of engagement and greater protection for the lives and property were afforded to those considered Islamic rebels.
Judeo-Christian philosophers have set out a clear set of rules as to what is considered a Just Cause, which they have broken down into Jus Ad Bellum and Jus in Bello. Both sets of rules have been formed over centuries with consideration for more universal moral values in relation to treatment of human beings during war. We may summarise these principles as follows:

JUS AD BELLUM
Last Resort- a just war can only be waged as a last resort. All non-violent options must be exhausted before the use of force can be justified.
Legitimate authority- a war is just only if it is waged by a legitimate authority. Even just causes cannot be served by actions taken by individuals or groups who do not constitute an authority sanctioned by whatever the society and outsiders to the society deem legitimate.
Redress- a just war can only be fought to redress a wrong suffered.
Self-defence - against an armed attack is always considered to be a just cause, as is the honouring of treaties with nations to whom a state is allied, this is when intervention is justified.
Right intention- a just war can only be fought with "right" intentions: the only permissible objective of a just war is to redress the injury.
Reasonable chance of success - a war can only be just if it is fought with a reasonable chance of success. Deaths and injury incurred in a hopeless cause are not morally justifiable.
The goal of peace - the ultimate goal of a just war is to re-establish peace. More specifically, the peace established after the war must be preferable to the peace that would have prevailed if the war had not been fought. Arguably this is also a Jus Post Bellum consideration.
Proportionality- the violence used in the war must be proportional to the injury suffered. States are prohibited from using force not necessary to attain the limited objective of addressing the injury suffered.
Discrimination - The weapons used in war must discriminate between combatants and non-combatants. Civilians are never permissible targets of war, and every effort must be taken to avoid killing civilians. The deaths of civilians are justified only if they are unavoidable victims of a deliberate attack on a military target.
(Source: Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

JUS IN BELLO
The Jus in Bello conventions are those, which govern conduct of combatants in war and have been formalised in the Hague conventions, the Geneva conventions and their protocols. Historically many writers have attempted to codify just conduct in war, one of the earliest being ‘The Art of War’ written in 6th Century BC by the Chinese warrior Sun Tzu, which suggested limiting the way that wars were conducted. The 2nd Century BC Hindu ‘Code of Manu’ introduced the notion of war crimes and Hugo Grotius’ work ‘On the Law of War and Peace’ (1625), focussed on the humanitarian treatment of civilians. The Hague conventions of 1899 and 1907 were early modern attempts by the international community to formalise the rules of engagement between nation states. They regulated
‘the commencement of hostilities and the conduct of belligerents and neutral powers towards each other and other nations and outlawed the use of certain types of weapons. The second Hague convention focussed on avoiding damage to culturally significant sites during wartime’, (source: Wikipedia, 2004).

The Geneva conventions and their protocols instigated by Henri Dunant , involved a massive international community to form treaties that set down standards for international law with regards to humanitarian concerns; over 190 nations have ratified all or part of these conventions . They lay down clear guidelines as to the conduct of war and the treatment of combatants and non-combatants during conflict. Two protocols were added to the conventions in 1977, to reflect changes in the style of combat. Protocol I is an addition to the Fourth Geneva convention and relates to the victims of international armed conflicts, interestingly in relation to the current War on Terror, neither Afghanistan, Iraq nor the USA are signatories to this protocol and are therefore not bound by its terms . (Wikipedia, 2005)

Agnostic Moral Reasoning

‘Huxley coined "agnosticism" on the basis that all knowledge must be based on reason. We cannot rationally claim to have access to knowledge that is beyond the powers of the intellect’ (Kirby, 2003)

It is necessary to understand both utilitarian and deontological foundations of morality, as both are contained in Just War Theory. The international community will require these tools to alter the existing or establish new, rules for engaging in the war on terror. The suggestion is not that we abandon Just War Theory, but that in its present form, its application is problematic.

Utilitarianism: A brief overview

Utilitarianism is a consequentialist form of moral reasoning based on the works of Jeremy Bentham (1781), John Stuart Mill (1863), G.E. Moore (1903) and Kenneth Arrow (1951). The utilitarian form of reasoning emphasises the greater good and emphasis is given to the purpose of making the world a better place. The Utilitarians make moral deductions using the utilitarian calculus i.e. a system where the Hedons are weighted against the Dolors , ergo if the Hedons are greater than the dolors then the utility of the act is deemed to be moral. These calculations can be used to provide General Rules or to ascertain if a single act is moral.
It is considered that ‘Utilitarianism is most appropriate for policy decisions, as long as a strong notion of fundamental human rights guarantees that it will not violate
rights of small minorities’, (Hineman, 2001).

Deontology- A Brief Overview
The deontological form of moral reasoning comes from the work of Immanuel Kant (1785), and emphasises obligation or duty. His work categorises duty as existing in two distinct categories. Internalised obligations and duties are those, which we as human beings impose upon ourselves. Externalised obligations are those that are given to us in the form of orders, laws and rules, which we believe we have a duty to obey. The internalised notion of duty is considered to be of greater moral significance than the second because it stems from a free choice that we as individuals will upon ourselves. The categorical imperative is based on the principle of universality, each moral choice must be willed to be applicable to all it is therefore a test for the maxims for action.

In warfare the deontological claim to have acted morally has become known as the Eichmann defence . Such a defence given by soldiers who are deemed to have acted immorally is often dismissed because it negates the categorical imperative, which is central to deontological ethics. In the recently highlighted cases of torture in Abu Ghraib, seven American soldiers have been charged with maltreating prisoners, photographs of the tortures that took place have shocked the world. Pte Lynndie England claimed in a CBS interview that she was obeying orders she said ‘I was instructed by persons in higher rank to stand there, hold this leash and they took a picture and that's all I know," (McDermott, (2004)). This illustrates a problem with deontology in relation to war, in particular in relation to conduct in war. Soldiers are faced with a conflict between their internal and external duties. There is no clear statement in international law or in Just War Theory, which tells the soldier when it is moral to disobey a direct order or when it is immoral to obey a direct order. The soldier faces military sanctions for refusing to obey an order and yet can face court martial or an international war crimes tribunal for obeying a direct order that contravenes international laws that pertain to conduct in war.

For the nation state externalised obligations in the form of orders both direct and indirect are placed on the individual soldier and yet as will be seen from the account of Cpl Mervin , when actually engaged in combat it is his internalised obligations that can take precedence, his duty to his own sense of what is the moral course of action. There is a conflict between the external duty to obey orders of the state and the soldiers internalised moral obligations. This internalised conflict applies to members of terrorist groups too. They internalise the belief that they have a duty to commit certain acts for a moral cause, the internalisation of a belief in a certain justice is a powerful motivation for men to commit acts that they would not otherwise consider, they are as Albert Camus termed it ‘Just Assassins’ (Camus, 1949).(S.McGonigal, 2005)
Footnotes
Children in infant school will exhibit an understanding of what is just and what is not, when they are wrongly accused of an act or participating in an act they will state that the accusation is unfair, if punished for the act they will have an even greater sense of injustice
Law to War, a set of criteria that are consulted before engaging in war, in order to determine whether entering into war is justifiable
Laws of War, rules and principles regulating conduct in an armed conflict between nations limited by Aquinas to discussion of whether it is lawful to lay ambush and the conduct of clerics in warfare
The obligations of those engaged in war with regard to the conditions that will exist after war has ceased.
. That which reflects the interests of the early Catholic church, although today it has incorporated far more than Christian interests, its foundations reflect the teachings of only one religion in a world where there are many. This may also be applied to Islamic Moral Reasoning.

I will refer to these last two types of moral reasoning as agnostic because they are based on reason and not based on an irrational claim to access to knowledge beyond powers of the intellect, which is what Huxley (1889) coined the term to mean.
Appendix A, Dawood, 1966, The Koran Speaks About Violence.
Dhimmi- A form of protection in Islamic law for non-combatants that allows them to retain communal autonomy within the Islamic State in return for tax payments. . This provision initially applied to Christians and Jews but later was broadened to include other religious communities living under Muslim rule
Henri Dunant -The founder of the International Red Cross was the motivating force behind these conventions, after witnessing appalling suffering by combatants at the Battle of Solférino (1859).
The first Geneva Convention of (1864) concerns the treatment of battlefield casualties; the Second Convention 1906 extended these principles to war at sea. The Third Geneva Convention (1929) set down rules for the treatment of prisoners of war, the Fourth Convention (1949) concerned itself with the treatment of civilians in enemy hands during wartime.
See Appendix F
From Wikipedia 2005 see reference section for internet link
Positive consequences
Negative consequences
After the claim by Nazi War Criminal Adolf Eichmann at The Nuremberg Trials that he was only obeying orders.
Pte England is awaiting trial for her part in what is referred to as the Abu Ghraib scandal. Spec. Armin J Cruz has received a one-year sentence after pleading guilty. S/Sgt Ivan Frederick and U.S. Army Spc. Charles Graner Jr have received sentences of 8 and 10 years respectively. (Source: CBC News, Feb 18th 2005)
Cpl Mervins account of a shooting of a Feyadeen see Chapter 4, p29.
Including the rules of the Geneva Conventions.

Chapter 2
War on Terror

‘Tuesday, Sept. 11, in a horrific series of events, hijacked planes hit and destroyed the twin towers of the World Trade Centre and crashed into the Pentagon in what's being described as the single worst act of terrorism on U.S. soil. The Bush administration and law enforcement officials are actively seeking those responsible and have declared war on terrorism’ (Babington, 2001).

The War on Terror is the response to the actions of a group of Moslem terrorists that the US intelligence agencies quickly identified as being Al-Queda. The name of their leader Osama Bin Laden is now recognised throughout the world. The US intelligence agencies ascertained that Al-Queda was operating out of Afghanistan with the sanction of the Taliban regime. On September 11th 2001, this group hijacked airliners within the sovereign territory of the United States of America and flew them into the Pentagon in Washington D.C. and the World Trade Centre in New York City, resulting in thousands of deaths and the complete destruction of the World Trade Centre. It was an attack on the economic and military centres of the United States, engineered to cause as much death, destruction and chaos within the USA as possible. The very public destruction of life brought with it a sudden realisation of vulnerability to the citizens of the USA. The terrorists had successfully created a climate of fear within the USA.

The response of the United States was to launch Operation Enduring Freedom on October 7th 2001, an attack on Afghanistan. This operation initially used massive air strike capability, combined with special- forces on the ground working with the assistance of local Afghani fighters and brought about a swift destruction of the Taliban regime, which had provided cover for the movement known as Al-queda. Although the Taliban regime has been destroyed, fighting in Afghanistan continues but the US focus of attention turned swiftly from Afghanistan to Iraq.
The claim was that Iraq, under the leadership of Saddam Hussein, was in possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction and sympathetic to the objectives of the Moslem terrorist networks. President Bush (2002) identified an ‘Axis of evil’ he stated ‘the U.S. will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons.” (Bush, 2002). The global coalition against terrorism therefore set about building a case for pre-emptive strikes against Iraq. A case which although hotly disputed by many nations resulted in a Pre-emptive strike, without a UN Mandate being launched on 19th of March 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom. This War is being fought using the two methods described in the introduction , but why have groups and small nations resorted to terrorism as a strategy for war?

It is no longer feasible for small nations or groups to wage war in its conventional form on nation states that have highly technologised military forces at their disposal. For the small nation, or group of stateless terrorism is the most viable strategy, they can, through a network of cells and for relatively little cost, attack the centres of power within these mighty nation states. Their objective being to create pressure for their demands to be met from within the nation they are attacking. They do this by using fear as a tool, the threat of violent acts anywhere at anytime upon the civilian population with the objective of a terrorised population pressurising their Government into meeting the demands of the terrorists. This concept underestimates the power of an internal politic of fear, which a Government can use to its advantage. Governments may even deliberately heighten the perception of risk to its own population to secure public support for retaliatory acts against the group responsible.(S.McGonigal, 2005)
Footnotes
State of the Union Address on 29th January 2002. President Bush identified the following terrorist groups Al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, Jaish-I-mohammed and the following nations Afghanistan, Somalia, North Korea, Iraq and Iran as constituting an Axis of Evil.
See Introduction- Pages 5 & 6
Stateless refers to groups of individuals from many nations who come together for a single cause be it religious, political or ideological, they commit terrorist acts on the sovereign territory of other nations.

Chapter 3
Problems for Jus Ad Bellum
“Ethics for him survival for us”
(Ashdown in Mileham and Willett (2001) p15)

Over the centuries warfare has undergone many permutations, as technologies have advanced and civilisations have waxed and waned. Primitive weapons technologies have given way to infinitely more sophisticated forms of delivering death and destruction to ones enemy. The capability for mass destruction once the sole preserve of Mother Nature now exists in the hands of Man. Technological advances in weapons are a major influence on how wars are fought. Warfare has always been influenced by the weapons at mans disposal, from the club and spear to the atomic bomb, weapons have determined how both aggressors and defenders fight. Adapting the strategies of one form of warfare to suit a new one, has throughout history resulted in lessons learned from first encountering a new weapon being built into new military strategies for future encounters.

Ethical considerations regarding military actions would appear to be secondary to the goal of victory. At one time in mans history, victory at any cost would have been acceptable to the population, a victory in war, brought glory and riches at home. But in today’s world where there is a television camera beaming the horrors of war into living rooms across the world, ethical considerations must be given to actions. Victory on the battlefield does not mean victory at the ballot box for a political party or leader, unless his victory is seen to be both Moral and Military. Hence ‘Violent fighting amongst humans has become almost inevitably expressed and elaborated by use of moral terms,’ (Bartoli, 2004, p.82), as is apparent in the moral language used by the Politicians of the coalition forces intent on selling the electorate the concept of a moral victory.

When Jus Ad Bellum was formed Monarchs were absolute and sometimes ruled by divine right, in the post-modern western world where Legitimate Authority rests is open to debate. Invariably one nation waged war on another, or occasionally there was civil war . The war on terror has changed this picture dramatically, coalitions of nations wage war, within the borders of other sovereign nations on groups who are united by a political, ideological or religious cause and collectively referred to as terrorists. However as Carter (2003) recognises, legitimate authority in the world of Global Institutions may well rest outside of the nation state altogether, in the hands of an institution such as the United Nations. Operation Iraqi Freedom was launched without a UN mandate and thus this raises a question with regard to Jus Ad Bellum. If Global institutions are the legitimate authority in which the nations of the world place the decision to declare war, what sanctions or penalties are there for a powerful nation that chooses to ignore this authority?

In the Post- modern world we see the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs collapsing as the process of globalisation marches on. The institutions of State and the institutions of the global community are blurred into intertwined bodies that appear powerless to act without the explicit sanction of the other . Cooper describes the main characteristics of the post-modern world as follows:

‘The breaking down of the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs, mutual interference in (traditional) domestic affairs and mutual surveillance. The rejection of force for resolving disputes and the consequent codification of self-enforced rules of behaviour, the growing irrelevance of borders: this has come about both through the changing role of the state, but also through missiles, motor cars and satellites and security is based on transparency, mutual openness, interdependence and mutual vulnerability’, (Cooper, 2002).

Sociologist Ulrich Beck (2001) argues that the concept of shared global risk is one of the driving forces of global institutions, he wrote ‘the dangers of the world risk society could be transformed into opportunities in order to create regional structures of cooperation between open world multinational states ‘(Beck, 2001). Yet actions such as the invasion of Iraq, under the auspices of a global war on terror are producing cracks in the foundations of these structures, Walzer(2000) warned that
‘Moral discourse is always suspect, and war is only an extreme case of the anarchy of moral meanings… especially so in time of violent conflict, that we can understand what other people are saying only if we see through their ‘fair pretenses’ and translate moral talk into the harder currency of interest talk,’ (Michael Walzer, (2000), p11).

As we have seen in relation to the War on Terror, the appearance of shared purpose can be deceptive. As opposed to this coming together under the umbrella of the UN to ensure global stability, the United States has shown a willingness to act in her own interests without the explicit consent of the United Nations. Although she has argued that the consent of the United Nations was implicit due to the non-compliance of Iraq with the requirements of UN resolution 1441 .. This illustrates that the USA recognises that proper authority rests with the United Nations, but that she too as a sovereign nation constitutes a proper authority. Jus Ad Bellum needs altered to clearly establish which proper authority should take precedence in which circumstances.

Former President and Nobel Prize Winner Jimmy Carter wrote a scathing attack of the US administrations policy of a pre-emptive strike in Iraq in the New York Times,

‘The unanimous vote of approval in the Security Council to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction can still be honored, but our announced goals are now to achieve regime change and to establish a Pax Americana in the region, perhaps occupying the ethnically divided country for as long as a decade. For these objectives, we do not have international authority’ (Carter, 2003)

He writes that with regard to this action, the US is in contravention of five of the Just War criteria those of Last Resort, Discrimination, Proportionality, Legitimate Authority, and the Goal of Peace.

The problem of Last resort in relation to Operation Iraqi Freedom is that it is not clear that all diplomatic efforts were exhausted . There is also a problem with proportionality. The response to the terrorist attacks of September the 11th 2001 was to wage war on an entire nation, due to the acts of a small number of individuals who were present in that nation with the sanction of the Taliban regime. Overwhelming airpower and military technology was used against large towns and cities, (Templeton, 2002). The number of Al-Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan is unknown (O’Neill, 2002). There is no dispute that terrorists were in Afghanistan, however given that their numbers were unknown, launching an air strike of such magnitude on Afghanistan would suggest not only to contravene the proportionality of the response but also calls into question the Jus ad Bellum convention of discrimination . It is clear that waging war on terrorist groups in such a manner will always cause problems with the Jus Ad Bellum conventions. New criteria need to be formulated that take into account what is a proportionate response to a terrorist attack.

Claims of the Coalition in the War on Terror

1) Weapons of Mass Destruction posed a threat to the international community, a claim to the Just Cause of right intention, to remove the risk to the international community. Several enquiries later the Coalition has been forced to admit that there are no Weapons of Mass Destruction.
2) The US Government led her public to believe that Iraq sponsored the terrorists responsible for the September the 11th attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, an attempt to find a Just Cause for invading Iraq in relation to redress. Such a claim has since been retracted.
3) The Just Cause of the goal of peace, with humanitarian objectives, to liberate an oppressed people from a ruthless dictator and establish a democracy.

All apparently Weapons of Mass Distraction, which highlight problems with jus ad bellum in relation to the war on terror. How does a nation prove beyond any reasonable doubt that her intelligence is correct to make a Just Case for War? Under the current premises and due to the nature of a War on Terror this is extremely difficult to do.

The reasons for waging war have not altered so distinctly over the centuries, Money, religion, race, power, resources, territory, treaties, debts are still the reasons given for War. Today we also claim to wage war to deliver peace, in the form of democracy and although the objective of peace has always featured heavily among moral theorists such as Aquinas who wrote,
‘Among true worshipers of God those wars are looked on as peacemaking, which are waged neither from aggrandizement nor cruelty but with the object of securing peace, of repressing evil and supporting the good’, (Aquinas, (1947 edition)).
Such an objective as installing democracy to create peace is controversial because it interferes with the rights of people living within a sovereign nation to self-determination. The question arises, whose version of peace are we delivering when we wage war? Is it our version of peace and good or is it a fundamental moral version of peace and good that is not formed out of our self-interest, but is formed on the basis of moral reasoning. Surely waging wars without elements of self-interest means that wars are waged out of altruistic intent. Is it possible to wage such a war?

Humanitarian Intervention can by some form of reason appear to be an altruistic act, nations selflessly running to the aid of people in other nations at times of instability and internal or international conflict. Indeed Ashdown (2001) tends towards the utilitarian argument that in this era of globalisation, military intervention in the affairs of sovereign nations is for the greater good of the world as a whole. He illustrates that there is often a choice to be made between human rights and sovereign rights and argues it is human rights that should take precedence. It would appear that Mr Ashdown is not alone in this way of reasoning. The current US administration has applied similar reasoning to the war in Iraq. Sovereign rights to self-determination have been disregarded until the fight for human rights has been won, that at least appears to be the current claim. At which point the right to self-determination will be reinstated through the ballot box in a form of democracy that will allow the people of Iraq to determine their own future. This is problematic for Jus ad Bellum it suggests that there is a need for a new convention that relates to military intervention on the basis of human rights abuses. The problem is that the Jus ad Bellum convention that relates to redress does not specifically relate to the right to redress injury caused to the citizens of a nation by their own government or countrymen. It relates to the right of a nation state to redress an injury suffered to itself or a nation to whom it is allied through a specific treaty.

If a global threat exists in the form of terrorism, or if the aims of the war on Iraq are truly humanitarian, the legitimate authority must rest with a global institution, not with individual nation state. It is then the sole right of the Global Institution to ascertain beyond all reasonable doubt that a wrong has been suffered, to exhaust all diplomatic efforts in relation to the problem and to redress that wrong by proportionate military means.(S.McGonigal, 2005.
Footnotes
Legitimate Authority tends to rest not with an absolutist monarch or a seemingly infallible leader of religious office, but with an elected representative of the people in a Democracy of some sort, or perhaps a constitutional Monarch within a Democracy or alternatively within a global institution

War confined to combatants from within a sovereign territory.
Nation states can veto the acts of the global institutions and the global institutions can refuse to give a sanction in the form of a mandate for the acts of nation states.
. . See Appendix C- United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441
The UN was clearly not satisfied that this had happened and therefore did not issue a mandate for military action. The UN weapons inspections teams had called for more time to ascertain if Saddam Hussein’s regime had Weapons of Mass Destruction and indeed to this date no such weapons have been found. In relation to Afghanistan it is not clear that any real diplomatic efforts were made at all, the action in Afghanistan began only 26 days after the September the 11th attack. If diplomatic efforts took place they were hardly exhaustive.

The terrorist actions of September the 11th claimed the lives of 3,233 people in total of whom 19 were thought to be the terrorists, 15 of which were Saudi nationals
There were an estimated 22,000 bombs dropped on Afghanistan during the first six months of the campaign resulting in approximately 3,620 civilian deaths (Templeton, 2002).
The number of Al-Qaeda operatives worldwide is estimated to be anywhere between 200 and 30,000 (O’Neill, 2002).
Templeton (2002) estimates that 25% of the bombs dropped missed their targets and that a further 10% did not explode on impact leaving behind a problem with land mines.

Chapter 4
The Problems for Jus In Bello

The conduct of war itself has gone through many permutations of what is acceptable and what is not. From generals riding out to meet their opposition on the battlefield to agree terms of conduct, to today’s guerrilla and terrorist tactics. There would appear to be no rules of conduct at all for one side while the other side must adhere to the international conventions regarding conduct in war to which they are signatories. In relation to a coalition force acting in the global interest this can be problematic because not all nations are signatories to the same conventions and protocols. Protocol I of the 4th Geneva Convention (1977) is an illustration of this problem.
The UK is a signatory to this protocol, therefore when engaged in a military action she is bound to treat all combatants as prisoners of war, providing that the combatant carries his arms openly. The USA is not a signatory to this protocol and as a result
Cook (2001) tells US Forces
‘ the individuals who initiated the terror attacks are clearly not ‘Soldiers’ in any moral or legal sense. They, and others who operate as they did from the cover of civilian identities, are not entitled to any of the protections of the war convention. This means that, if captured, they are not entitled to the benevolent quarantine of the POW convention or of domestic criminal law. For the purposes of effective response to these individuals, as well as for future deterrence, it may be highly undesirable even if they are captured to carry out the extensive due process of criminal proceedings. If we can identify culpable individuals to a moral certainty, their swift and direct elimination by military means is morally acceptable and probably preferable in terms of their goals and policy’, (Cook, M, 2001).

This means that some coalition soldiers will be free to engage in actions in war that other nations whom they are fighting alongside regard as unjust . For a British Soldier to execute a prisoner in civilian clothing who bore arms openly is a war crime, but for a US soldier to do the same is that American soldier doing his duty.

The modern soldier, the insurgent and the terrorist are more open to criticism for their actions than ever before. In modern conflicts a heavy media presence means that actors are constantly under surveillance. This allows greater moral scrutiny of their actions. However, a photograph or even video footage does not tell the whole story. In order to form a more accurate picture of what is going on, we rely on eyewitness accounts .

For the soldier to act in accordance with the wishes of his state he is subjected to a bombardment of military socialisation in which the enemy to be engaged is dehumanised. Greetham refers to this as Moral Anaesthesia he argues that
‘ to habituate someone to killing on any scale, let alone mass slaughter, it is necessary to switch off their empathetic reactions: that capacity to experience what your victim feels. It should surprise no one that to get servicemen to do something they would never have done otherwise (to kill those they do not know and who have never done them any harm), it is necessary to search for moral safety in distinctions that depersonalise and demonise the enemy’ (Greetham, B, 2000).

Given that this is a process in which the military has engaged for centuries and is a necessary process without which it is presumed soldiers would not fight, they can enter into conflict sure in the knowledge that they are fighting for a just cause, against an enemy who is not a moral person. Moral anaesthesia can also be applied to terrorists, who also undergo a process of socialisation and psychological indoctrination in the name of their ideological, religious or political Just Cause. We should not be surprised then when actions are taken in our names, by soldiers or terrorists fighting for their respective causes which horrify the moral communities, safe at home in front of their television sets. Both the soldiers and the terrorists have dehumanised their respective enemies.

During the war in Iraq as in many previous conflicts house to house clearances take place, in this situation the decisions taken by the soldiers on the ground engaged in this practice are often made there and then on an individual basis. The moral right or wrong of a particular course of action is a dilemma that every soldier must face, based on the circumstances at the time and his subjective perception of risk. Soldiers have a duty to preserve their own lives and those of their fellow soldiers and therefore this will influence the decisions taken, often overriding any concept of morality. A recent eye- witness report in the Socialist Worker . Gave a graphic account of what happened in Fallujah during such an operation, it is summarised as follows; Hudda is a 17 year old woman from the Jolan district of Fallujah. She was in her home with four others when the siege began. American Marines came to her house they
1) Killed both her father and neighbour.
2) Beat and Killed her sister.
3) Smashed up the furniture
4) Robbed the bodies.
5) Days later Hudda and her brother emerged from their hiding place to flee the city.
6) Hudda was shot in the leg.
7) Hudda’s 13 year old brother was shot and killed. (Socialist Worker, 2005)
The deliberate targeting of non-combatants is an accepted definition of terrorism; therefore this appears to be state terrorism, or ethnic cleansing. The soldiers who committed these acts are engaged in a conflict where the other combatants deliberately conceal their identities. We tend to think of combatants as men and yet we know that terrorists come in both genders and all age groups . We know that terrorists deliberately use civilians as cover for their activities, with no moral consideration for the welfare of the civilians. Therefore we must consider the soldiers perspective of these events.
1) Soldiers, who have been distanced from their empathetic reactions (Greetham, 2000), are ordered to engage in house clearances.
2) The soldiers are given intelligence that terrorists and insurgents are hiding among the civilian population; therefore the soldier cannot distinguish the terrorist from the non-combatants therefore every person encountered is perceived as a threat.
3) When a soldier knocks on a door his or her experience of knocking on previous doors or seeing others knock on doors comes into play. If the Soldier has knocked on a door and witnessed or heard about other soldiers engaged in house clearances being met by a person with a weapon. His reaction to knocking on all other doors will invariably be one of greater caution than it was knocking on the first door.
4) His experience tells him that behind every door lays a risk. A young female may be as likely to conceal a weapon as a middle aged or elderly man.
The soldier is faced with a moral dilemma, does he?
a) Kill every person he finds in a house to eliminate the risk to himself and his fellow soldiers of being killed.
b) Kill none or just some of the inhabitants of a house and leave others who may conceal a weapon and shoot him as he leaves.
The decisions the soldiers take have to be immediate, his time to make a reasoned moral decision is very limited. Pausing to weigh up the situation may cost him his life. Such decisions are therefore both immediate and subjective. In an instant the decisions taken can have very different outcomes and the unforeseen consequences of different courses of action will have an impact on how the end result appears to the wider world.
From the soldiers perspective this is what actually happened in Hudda’s home.
1) Upon knocking on the door to the house the soldiers are met by two men. This constitutes a threat. The threat is neutralised.
2) There is movement elsewhere in the house. They proceed into the house and find a female she constitutes a threat. The threat is neutralised.
3) A search of the house is conducted in which furniture is destroyed.
4) A search of the bodies is conducted. Money is removed from the corpses to prevent it falling into terrorist hands.
5) Satisfied that there is no possible threat from the occupants of that house they proceed to the next.
Were any of these actions moral? As Walzer (2000) explained once we translate morality into the harder currency of interest talk we can begin to make sense of individual actions. Self- interest in the form of preservation of the lives of the soldiers engaged in the act and those soldiers, who would follow them, would appear to be a major influence in the moral reasoning of these soldiers. Walzer (2004) refers to this duty to preserve their own lives and those of their colleagues as ‘military responsibility’ (Walzer, 2004, p.23-32).
They have a duty to obey orders and are thus engaged in house clearances as they advance. The soldier’s perception is that each building contains a threat to their safety and the safety of their colleagues and that each person who remains in the buildings constitutes a risk to the soldiers of being attacked at a later date from the rear. Their intelligence tells them that terrorists are hiding within the civilian population. The soldiers have therefore reasoned that because they are unable to identify the terrorists, they are morally obliged to ‘neutralise’ every perceived threat. Thus they have chosen to kill every inhabitant in the building. From the American soldiers perspective because he cannot distinguish between a combatant and a non-combatant these actions are moral.
We then must ask why Hudda herself was shot when she and her brother eventually emerged from the house. A civilian running in an area already cleared may have been perceived as a person ‘up to no good’ perhaps running weapons or carrying information about the whereabouts of the soldiers to terrorists. This has moral implications for the soldiers:
1) The running civilian is an unidentified person, as is the terrorist, the soldier has a duty to protect themselves and their colleagues from threat.
2) The civilian may pose a threat therefore again the soldiers made the decision to neutralise what they perceived as a threat. From a moral standpoint there is utility in neutralising threat.
3) The risks to soldiers’ lives are increased with every threat that is not dealt with.
4) The soldier who leaves a person alive only to find that that person has returned to kill one of his colleagues could be accused of dereliction of duty.
Of course the actions of the American soldiers are due to the actions terrorists themselves, who by refusing to clearly distinguish themselves from the non-combatants, are putting the entire civilian population at risk.
According to the US perspective of Cook (2001), these American soldiers have acted in a moral way. British Soldiers are however bound by the terms of Protocol I of the 4th Geneva convention 1977 and as such would have had a duty to afford the protections of that protocol to the people they encountered in house clearances. Therefore although both the US and the UK forces are acting as a coalition, the treatment of combatants and civilians in Iraq is dependant on which forces are engaged in that geographical area.
. Cpl Mervin (2005) gives an account of an incident in which he witnessed children aged approximately five or six years old running for their lives, under fire from a man in civilian clothing, a Feyadeen. Cpl Mervin and his colleague witnessed a young girl shot and returned fire on the Feyadeen man, who was killed. He explains why he had no interest in capturing the Feyadeen, in spite of being aware of his moral responsibility to attempt to do so.
‘ Whatever the militia’s excuse, it wouldn’t bring back that little girl’s life. To capture the Feyadeen (militia men) alive was an immoral act as far as we were concerned, because we were obliged to treat them with respect: give them medical treatment, food, water and shelter. The food was far better than our ration packs. And what did we get in return from those bastards? Nothing but constant complaints and threats of lawsuits because they claimed they were being mistreated.’ He continues ‘I listened to these parasites while building a prisoner- of- war camp complaints from the same bastards who would force children, some three years old, to drink petrol and then shoot them with a tracer round. The burning phosphorous round would ignite the petrol and make it explode inside their stomachs. The parents were forced to witness this. I kept thinking of my own three kids back at home. Of how I would feel’
(Mervin, K, (2005)).

This account illustrates the soldiers reasoning of morality, he is making moral judgement based on emotion, something that the philosophers and moral writers tell us we must separate ourselves from if we are to make rational judgements about what is moral and what is not. Cpl Mervin is aware of his duty to abide by the rules, yet this account clearly illustrates that no matter what moral rules exist, they are formed within an emotional vacuum of philosophical and political debate. When it comes to actual moral conduct in warfare, emotions affect decisions. The soldier is not an abstract being, free from the human burden of emotion, he is a human being with human emotions. He knows what the rules say he should do, how he should act, but the chasm between should and actual action is filled with emotional turmoil. Emotional responses are therefore problematic for any moral code that pertains to conduct in warfare. The soldier’s duty to his nation is external in the form of obeying orders and his morality is an internalised obligation, thus he experiences a moral dilemma. . For Cpl Mervin, it was not moral to capture a man whom he had seen kill a child and give him rations and extend to him the rights of a prisoner of war.

The actions of the terrorist are made out of a personal choice to fight for a cause, their internalised beliefs are used to rationalise their behaviour as being moral. Their duty to their cause is internal not external. Thus their actions do not constitute a moral dilemma with the same intensity as that of the soldier of the Nation State.

Bauman (1993) argues, ‘morality is non-rational’, is he therefore suggesting that morality is emotional? He states,
‘ Moral questions cannot be answered by recourse to universal reason, nor subjected to means-end calculation, because morality does not entail the sense of reciprocity that such calculation would imply. Moral dilemmas therefore cannot be resolved by resorting to ethical principles. Moral impulses tend to be contradictory and uncertain: the outcome of moral actions is not always satisfactory’, (Bauman 1993, p.11).

Bauman is suggesting that utilitarian calculations are flawed because they negate the emotional responses and actions of the human being and that ethical principles cannot be used to resolve this conflict between emotion and rationality or the chasm between intentional and unintentional consequences. Evidence for emotional considerations to be taken account of in any method of calculation moral behaviour in regards to the actions of individual soldiers is overwhelming. Anger, compassion, guilt, fear, hate, love, even the ability to identify with the human characteristics and actions of the enemy will influence his behaviour, as Walzer (2000) illustrated in ‘Just and Unjust Wars’ when he examined the actions of Wilfred Owen, Robert Graves, Raleigh Trevelyan, Emilio Lussu and George Orwell, (Walzer (2000), p.138-151). These men all acted as men not combatants, when they recognised human qualities in the enemy. S. McGonigal(2005)
Footnotes
See Appendix F Article 44 of Protocol I of the 4th Geneva Convention 1977.
A photograph of a dead body for instance shows just that, a dead body. It does not tell us how the person died, who killed the person or in what circumstances they were killed. In the digital age photographs and video footage can be altered fairly easily prior to distribution through the worlds media organisations.

Eyewitness accounts from Journalists, civilians and combatants may contain biases, as they are subjective accounts.
House clearances ensure that the logistical lines of supply and a line of retreat for combatant forces remain open. They eliminate risk of attack from behind as forces advance and thus are necessary for the safety of any force advancing through a town or city. When combatants are indistinguishable from the civilian population it is presumed that every inhabitant of every building constitutes a threat to advancing forces.
. See Appendix B for this article- Fallujah-The truth at last- Socialist worker, January, 2005.
The town of Fallujah was considered hostile by the coalition forces, a strong hold of Iraqi insurgents loyal to the regime of Saddam Hussein and foreign terrorists engaged in a Jihad. The terrorists and insurgents are thought to have deliberately concealed themselves among the civilian population.
Walzer (2000) uses this definition of terrorism.
Evidence of this arises as a result of reports from many acts of terrorism including the school siege at Beslan, the Moscow Theatre siege, acts committed by Hamas and Hezbullah against the state of Israel such as suicide bombings.

Chapter 5

Moral Relativism, Just War and Jihad

‘Morality is of the highest importance-but for us, not for God’
(Einstein, 1954)

The Judeo-Christian culture that dominated the Western world for centuries has formed the basis for the primary moral philosophies of modern society. In a world where the North, South, East and West come together in Global institutions there is an argument for adapting Just War Theory to incorporate the moral philosophies of other cultures, so that it is truly inclusive. The characteristics of the Post- modern world as described by Cooper (2002) . Suggest that the world is becoming a global community. Therefore we should be attempting to find a moral metanarrative concerning warfare for the global community. A set of shared intrinsic ideals, which are not concerned with race, creed, religion, culture, gender, nationality, political affiliation or any other of the divisive labels that are placed on mankind. There are inherent qualities of the human being. Humanity is after all a single species of animal and thus what should be examined in relation to morality is what aspects of the human condition are truly universal.

The West was morally outraged when the beheadings of American hostages in Iraq were put on the Internet by the terrorist groups, but as Moslems their morality stems from the Koran where beheading is not an immoral act in warfare, ‘ When you meet unbelievers in the battlefield strike off their heads’, (Dawood, 1966) p121). This means that it is moral to behead a person as long as two criteria are met:
i) The person to be beheaded must be an unbeliever
ii) The act of beheading must take place in the battlefield.
An unbeliever is defined in the Qu’ran as a person who does not believe in Allah and/or debars others from his path. It is not clear if all unbelievers are classified as combatants if a Jihad is waged because of the different interpretations of what a Jihad actually is. Wuthnow (1998) provides examples of different interpretations of Jihad and Al-Qaeda sets out 39 principles of Jihad .., (Leydon, 2003), which afford protections to believers but not to any non-believer. The battlefield for the terrorist is Dar al-Harb . We can deduce that within the war on terror from the perspective of the Al-Qaeda terrorist, every non-believer is a combatant and everywhere occupied by a non-believer is the battlefield. For the Moslem terrorist then beheading an unbeliever is a moral act. Yet in the west it is viewed as being an act, which illustrates a lack of morality in the Moslem terrorist, an illustration of moral relativism. Just war theory does not tell us how we are to kill, only that we must kill in a way that is proportionate, which discriminates between combatants and non-combatants. Is there a greater morality in killing by dropping bombs on targets or using landmines, than killing by shooting a person or by the sword? Obviously not, the latter two provide greater discrimination between combatants and non-combatants.
The problem in the war on terror is that an inter-culturally, internationally agreed definition of combatant status does not exist. A need exists to clearly establish exactly who combatants are, if they are solely those who openly carry arms or if this category also includes those individuals who are involved in the support of military actions, such as supply of arms and intelligence, provision of monetary or political support, propagandists etc. The outcome of this determination would need to be included in international educational programmes that were sanctioned by not only governments but also by religious leaders and teachers on all sides, so that those who recognise a God as a higher authority also have a clear understanding of who it is morally right to engage in combat. Al-Qaeda recognises the importance of education in support of its objectives ., the international community must also participate in a counter attack within the educational base of Islamic nations, one that promotes moral conduct in war from a non- relativist perspective, if the international community is to establish any workable rules for conduct in a war on terror.
Bauman (1993) argues that morality cannot be reduced to local custom or tradition and yet it appears that this is exactly what has happened recently in relation to morality and war. The morality of the West has been reduced to the customs and traditions of Judeo-Christian cultures through the acceptance of Just War Theory by the International Community (Telford Taylor (1992), Rostow (1995)) and is perceived as though it has a universal foundation. The teachings of Islam (Dawood (1966), Wuthnow 1998), illustrate that the foundations of Just War Theory are not universal. Universality of a Moral Code that pertains to war is important if Global institutions are to create a Just War Theory that inclusive of all cultures and exclusive to none. In the West and in the Global institutions the legitimate authority in whom the power to declare war is vested is political, thus it is a political entity that takes responsibility for human action in war. In Islamic culture the higher authority is religious, it is the religious leaders and ultimately Allah in whom the responsibility for human action in war is vested. The distinction under current international laws is that combatants of a State bear no personal or moral responsibility for killing in war providing they abide by the rules. The terrorist has no state authority to bear the same responsibility ergo his act of killing is perceived by nation states as immoral.
In both cases personal responsibility for actions is limited to those actions that are set down as NOT permitted. There exists a duty to act in accordance with the moral code that applies only in war- time. Killing is murder in peace time, killing is duty in war the act is the same only the circumstances differ. The international political community accepts that moral responsibility for killing is taken from the combatants by the State. Orwell, 1941 explains,
’ As I write, highly civilised human beings are flying overhead trying to kill me. They do not feel any enmity toward me as an individual nor I against them. They are only ‘doing their duty’ as the saying goes. Most of them, I have no doubt are kind hearted, law abiding men, who would never dream of committing murder in private life. On the other hand, if one of them succeeds in blowing me to pieces with a well placed bomb, he will never sleep the worse for it. He is serving his country, which has the power to absolve him from evil’ (Orwell, 1941).

It is this moral relativism that is a problem for western nations who are engaged in a war on terror. The alternative to failing to eradicate relativist perspectives and incorporate the assistance of the Islamic Scholars and prominent religious teachers into debates to form a truly international Just War Theory, is to simply abandon Just War Theory altogether and to fight an all out war, without rules, where the only consideration is victory at any cost.S.SMcGonigal( 2005)
footnotes
. See Chapter 3, p19 for Cooper (2002) characteristics of the postmodern world.
. See Appendix D for definitions of Jihad.

. . See Appendix E.
Dar al-harb- Land of War as defined by Islamic Legal Scholars, the purpose of Jihad is to reduce the Dar al- harb to the Dar al-Islam-land of Islam, see Wuthnow (1998).
. Sections 22, 23, 24, 29, 33, 34 & 36 of Appendix E.

Chapter 6
Global Institutions and The Human Rights Model
’The pre-modern world is a world of failed states. Here the state no longer fulfils Weber’s criterion of having the monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Either it has lost the legitimacy or it has lost the monopoly of the use of force; often the two go together’ and ‘ Within the post-modern world, there are no security threats in the traditional sense; that is to say, its members do not consider invading each other. Whereas in the modern world, following Clausewitz’ dictum war is an instrument of policy in the post-modern world it is a sign of policy failure. But while the members of the post-modern world may not represent a danger to one another, both the modern and pre-modern zones pose threats.’
(Cooper 2002).

So where does this leave moral codes that concern themselves with war in a Post- modern globalised world? The higher authority is no longer the nation state concerned with its self-interest, but a set of globalised institutions with fragmented interests, with different belief systems, it is at the same time a coming together and a separation.
Cooper (2002) suggests that the legitimate monopoly on the state use of force in the pre-modern world lies outside the nation state. It has passed to a new higher authority a body such as the United Nations. This new higher authority represents not only the post-modern world, but also the modern and pre-modern worlds, among whom, according to Cooper (2002) there exist threats. It is logical to conclude that with this passing of authority regarding legitimate use of force to an international institution, the concerns of moral action should also pass to that new higher authority. Indeed we see increasing emphasis on Human Rights in a global sense. Human rights that stem not from tradition, culture, religion or even the interest of the state or political party, but rights that are considered to be the basis for what is just with regard to the human beings on the planet. Garrett (2004) argues that

‘Human rights are moral tools that have been developed to recognize the equal basic claim that human beings have to the basic goods of life, human social existence, self determination, equal basic value of person, integrity, internal harmony, awareness and knowledge or to the opportunity to acquire them’, and that ‘Human rights protect a baseline below which human beings should not be allowed to fall insofar as possible, and especially below which they should not be pushed,’ (Garrett, 2004).

It is therefore a Human rights model that I propose we accept as the basis for delivering a Just war theory in relation to the war on terror. Anthropologist Andrea Bartoli in her 2004 paper ‘Developing Inter-Cultural Moral Enlightenment for Leaders, Both National and Global’ argues for the need for collective moral enlightenment and points to the 1948 Declaration of Human rights as an achievement by the international community that could work as a model for inter-cultural moral enlightenment. Shweder (2002) suggests we should shrink away from the proponents of moral relativism because,
“Relativism suggests an adaptationist conception of morality, in which morality is judged nonmorally – in the way a hammer might be judged well or poorly adapted to its function of hammering nails – by its contribution to the survival, or other goals, of a society’, (Shweder 2002).

We need to embrace those such as Bartoli (2004) who argue for collective inter-cultural moral enlightenment if the institutions of globalisation are to successfully protect the human rights of everyone in times of war. Global institutions need to concern themselves with globalised moralities ones that are debated and constructed in the global interest not moralities that are constructed in solely national, cultural or religious interests. This requires inclusion of all cultural and religious interests, discussion and debate between political and religious philosophers. It requires recognition of the existence of fundamental human rights, no matter what religious or cultural beliefs of the individual are and an international education programme that focuses on similarities of interests not differences, an inter-cultural, international programme of discussion and debate in which all human interests are represented. S.McGonigal (2005)

Chapter 7
A New Theory for War

What this paper has attempted to do is examine the problems with the existing rules of engagement. The way in which, nation states and individual soldiers are using Just War Theory in its current form in the War on Terror. Just War Theory purports to give the international community a set of rules for sorting out problems between state actors, but in the war on terror there are no rules for states to sort out problems between themselves and non-state actors. This suggests that Just War Theory needs altering to provide clear rules for wars between state actors and non-state actors.
In the introduction Cooper (2002) sets the stage for asking what constitutes a Just War in this post-modern era. Chapter 1 examined the current Just War Theory and the methods of moral reasoning that provide tools for producing a new Just War theory. Wuthnow (1998) presented the notion that contrary to popular conception a modernist Jihad is the Islamic equivalent of a Just War.
Chapter 2 examined the War on Terror giving a Western account of the conflict and an explanation of Jihad. This chapter also briefly examined why groups resort to terrorism. Chapter 3 examined the problems for Jus Ad Bellum in the War on Terror and identified problems in not clearly establishing who or what constitutes a legitimate authority in the era of globalisation. This Chapter also identified a need for a new Jus ad Bellum convention that relates to waging war on humanitarian grounds.
Problems were also found with the adherence by the coalition forces to the Jus Ad Bellum conventions on proportionality, Last Resort, the goal of peace and discrimination, this pointed to a lack of power within the Global Institutions to enforce adherence to Just War Conventions when they are disregarded by militarily powerful Nations.

Chapter 4 addresses the difficulties with Jus in Bello when engaged in a war on terror and found that there are two main problems.
1. Discriminating between combatants and non-combatants is extremely difficult for the forces of nation states, and yet it is necessary that they do so in order that they can comply with the terms of the conventions and protocols to which their nation state is signatory. The terrorist can easily identify his adversaries and yet has no such conventions to abide by.
2. Uniformity of action. The coalition forces consist of soldiers of member states, not all nation states have ratified the same conventions and protocols, and this means that the coalition forces do not have a uniform policy with regards to the treatment, status and rights afforded to the nationals of other nations.

The military of the USA is not a signatory to the protocols that afford the status of prisoner of war on unidentified combatants who openly bear arms. This is particularly significant when fighting a war against terrorists. These individuals are thus regarded by the USA as neither civilians nor combatants and thus are afforded none of the protections of the Geneva Conventions with regards to their treatment. Neither are terrorists, when captured afforded the status of a criminal, they are for all intents and purposes in the eyes of the American Military, sub-human, with no rights whatsoever.
Chapter 5 illustrates that with regards to the war on terrorism the fundamental moral problems exist because of relativist concepts of morality and authority. In Chapter 6 it is suggested that Global Institutions such as the United Nations should form the Legitimate Authority and create a Just War theory that is based on a Human Rights model.

The UN a global organisation with members from 191 of the worlds 193 countries has failed to produce an up-to-date cohesive moral code for conduct in war.

The challenge to the United Nations

Bertoli (2004) argued that the international community managed to work together to bring about a Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and thus it seems feasible that the same international community under the auspices of the United Nations should work to build and codify a moral theory for War, one which is compulsory for all member states and all citizens and groups within those member states. One which if a nation state or her citizens fail to adhere to would result in sanctions such as loss of voting rights or expulsion from the United Nations. The model for this code should be the human rights model, (Bertoli (2004), Garrett (2004)). The new just war theory should not only concern itself with Jus ad Bellum, Jus in bello and Jus post bello, but should also concern itself with the impact of weapons on the environment.

Utilitarianism and the Human Rights models give the United Nations a methodology from which to begin the process of developing a New Just War Theory. The development of this code would require input from global religious and political leaders, Philosophers from all disciplines and Psychologists(45) so that it is acceptable to and inclusive of all cultures. This international moral code for conduct in war could then be taught alongside religious teachings, with the sanction of religious leaders and become part of the socialisation and educational processes that occur in societies. Thus, even terrorist groups could have an understanding and acceptance of International Moral War codes. Once accepted and codified by a truly international community, nation states would be answerable for the conduct of their citizens under international law and in an international court. Such a concept although apparently idealistic is feasible and would ensure that when conflicts occur, no matter who the combatants are, they are all fighting within the same moral frame work. The alternative to this is to simply abandon all laws that pertain to war and wage total war, which would allow for every atrocity to be committed with no recourse to the law.

The following proposed Just War Theory presupposes that the UN has provided a clear definition of the status of combatant and has formulated provision for when it is moral for a soldier to disobey a direct order. It is also presupposed that the Human Rights Model has been used to develop existing conventions and protocols for Conduct in War and that compulsory ratification of these conventions and protocols is a criterion for membership with voting rights of the United Nations.

45. Psychological participation is necessary to devise solutions to the problems of emotional responses causing moral dilemmas for soldiers

Just War Theory

1) Legitimate authority- a war is just only if it is waged by a legitimate authority. The final legitimate authority is the United Nations. Both State and Religious authorities must present their case to the United Nations for a mandate to act, prior to any action taken. Just causes cannot be served by actions taken by States, individuals or groups who do not comply this ruling.
2) Last Resort- a just war can only be waged as a last resort. All non-violent options must be exhausted before the use of force can be justified. Disgruntled groups must make their case to the United Nations in order that diplomatic channels can be opened between themselves and nation states, they may do this through a State, Religious leader or a neutral party.
3) Discrimination – Combatants and military targets are the only permissible targets in war. The definition of combatant status as provided by the United Nations is the only acceptable definition. The weapons used in war must discriminate between combatants and non-combatants. Civilians are never permissible targets of war, and every effort must be taken to avoid killing civilians. The deaths of civilians are justified only if they are unavoidable victims of a deliberate and proportionate attack on a military target.
4) The goal of peace – the ultimate goal of a just war is to re-establish peace. More specifically, the peace established after the war must be preferable to the peace that would have prevailed if the war had not been fought.
5) Environmental Protection – The use of weapons that constitute a long- term threat to the environment local or global are not permitted.
6) Reasonable chance of success – a war can only be just if it is fought with a reasonable chance of success. Deaths and injury incurred in a hopeless cause are not morally justifiable.
7) Proportionality- the violence used in the war must be proportional to the injury suffered. States are prohibited from using force not necessary to attain the limited objective of addressing the injury suffered.
8) Right intention- a just war can only be fought with “right” intentions: the only permissible objective of a just war is to redress the injury.
9) Conduct in War – All Nation States must be signatory to the conventions and protocols that govern conduct in war. This must be compulsory for all members of the United Nations. Sanctions for none compliance by member states will be loss of voting rights or expulsion from the United Nations. Religious Leaders and representatives of groups that wish to use the diplomatic channels(46) of the United Nations must be granted the authority to sign these conventions on behalf of the group prior to diplomatic channels being opened. Failure to do so will result in the loss of all rights for that group to diplomatic discussion before, during or after a conflict. This will remove the obligations of the nation states engaged in the conflict and on whom the act of aggression has been perpetrated to adhere to the conventions and protocols pertaining to conduct in war. Furthermore the United Nations will grant assistance to nation states, which have tried and failed to open diplomatic discussions with such groups.

10) Redress- a just war can only be fought to redress a wrong suffered. This includes the right by nation states to wage war on groups in other nations that commit hostile acts on their territories
11) Self-defence – against an armed attack is always considered to be a just cause, as is the honouring of treaties with nations to whom a state is allied, this is when intervention is justified. This must also include the right of the United Nations to use military force in actions that constitute a global risk.
12) Humanitarian Redress – United Nations forces or coalitions of forces sanctioned by the United Nations may engage in conflict to protect the citizens of a nation from the hostile actions of their own Government. The United Nations may also intervene Governments fail to protect their citizens from atrocities committed by groups within their sovereign territory.

The criteria 1-9 must be adhered to for any war to be deemed just. A minimum of 10 criteria must be adhered to in order for a war to be just. S.McGonigal(2005)

46. See Part 2 –last resort.

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A
Koran / Qur-án on War and Peace
Part II

The Koran
Speaks about Violence
Part II
Source: The Koran, translated by N. J. Dawood, 1966 revised edition, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England

Note: It is difficult to know the true meaning of any foreign text after translation. There is much debate over the meaning of many phrases and even letters used in the Koran. Nevertheless, the English translation reveals valuable information we can use to form a general, or rather precise in some cases, view of the original meaning of the Koran.
Note also before judging the Koran that many passages lend themselves to other interpretations in its original tongue, which are not addressed in the present translation.

Introduction (excerpts):
Mohammed was born in Mecca about the year A.D. 570 and had come under the influence of Jewish and Christian teachings. According to Muslim tradition, one night the Angel Gabriel came to him and said: ³Recite!²
Mohammed, who disclaimed power to perform miracles, firmly believed that he was the messenger of God, sent forth to confirm previous scriptures. God had revealed His will to the Jews and the Christians through chosen apostles, but they disobeyed God¹s commandments and divided themselves into schismatic sects.
Having thus gone astray, they must be brought back to the right path, to the true religion preached by Abraham. This was Islam‹absolute submission or resignation to the will of Allah.
But, owing to the fact that the kufic script in which the Koran was originally written contained no indication of vowels or diacritical points, variant readings are recognized by Muslims as of equal authority.

Man was created to be tested with afflictions:
p. 31 We created man to try him with afflictions.
p. 37 Know that we send down to the unbelievers devils who incite them to evil. Therefore have patience: their days are numbered.

Man¹s deeds cause his own condemnation:
p. 56 Each soul is the hostage of its own deeds. . . .
p. 65 Men, it is your own souls that you are corrupting . . . to Us [the Gods] you shall in the end return, and We will declare to you all that you have done.
p. 290 The Day of Reckoning is drawing near, yet the people heedlessly persist in unbelief. They listen flippantly to each fresh warning that their Lord gives them: their hearts are set on pleasure.
p. 293 We showed Moses and Aaron the distinction between right and wrong, and gave them a light and an admonition for righteous men: those who truly fear their Lord and dread the terrors of Judgment-day.

Going to war with believers:
[Note: ³Repentant² Christians, Jews & Muslims are classed among the ³believers.² What that repentance is must remain for another discussion.]
p. 268 If two parties of believers take up arms the one against the other, make peace between them. If either of them commits aggression against the other, fight against the aggressors till they submit to Allah¹s judgment. When they submit make peace between them in equity and justice; Allah loves those who act in justice.
The believers are a band of brothers. Make peace among your brothers and fear Allah, so that you may be shown mercy.
272 Mohammed is Allah¹s apostle. Those who follow him are ruthless to the unbelievers but merciful to one another.
p. 302 But if they give no heed to you, bear in mind that your mission is only to give plain warning. [This appears to contradict p. 272. That doesn¹t mean it does.]
p. 352 There shall be no compulsion in religion.
p. 273 Yet to those of them who will embrace the Faith and do good works He has promised forgiveness and a rich reward.
p. 378 Do not allow your hatred for other men to turn you away from justice.
p. 303 Allah . . . leaves in error whom He will and gives guidance to whom He pleases. You shall be questioned about all your actions.

How Muslims are to conduct war with their enemies:
p. 121 When you meet the unbelievers in the battlefield strike off their heads and, when you have laid them low, bind your captives firmly. Then grant them their freedom or take ransom from them, until War shall lay down her armour.
Thus shall you do. Had Allah willed, He could Himself have punished them; but He has ordained it thus that He might test you, the one by the other.
As for those who are slain in the cause of Allah, He will not allow their works to perish.
p. 124 We shall put you to the proof until We know the valiant and the resolute among you and test all that is said about you. . . .
Those that disbelieve and debar others from Allah¹s path and in the end die unbelievers shall not be shown forgiveness by Allah. Therefore do not falter or sue for peace when you have gained the upper hand. Allah is on your side and will not grudge you the reward of your labours.
p. 209 . . . do not kill except for a just cause (manslaughter is forbidden by Him). . . .

Day of judgment will bring a monster to overtake sinners:
p. 86 Your Lord is bountiful to men: yet most of them do not give thanks. . . .
On the day when Our judgment overtakes them, We will bring out form the earth a monster that shall speak to them. . . .
On that day there shall be gathered from every nation a multitude of those who disbelieved Our revelations. They shall be led in separate bands before Allah. . . Those who have done good shall be rewarded with what is better, and shall be secure form the terrors of that day.
p. 95 Had it been His will to scourge them for their sins, He would have hastened their punishment; but He has set for them an appointed hour, which they shall never escape.
And all those nations! We destroyed them when they did wrong; yet in their imminent destruction We gave them warning.
p. 102 Allah will reward each soul according to its deeds. Swift is Allah¹s reckoning.

When the sky will pour down blinding smoke:
p. 145 Wait for the day when the sky will pour down blinding smoke, enveloping all men: a dreadful scourge. Then they will say: ³Lord, lift up this scourge from us. We are now believers.² But how will their new faith help them, when an undoubted prophet had come to them and they denied him, saying: ³A madman, taught by others!²
Yet if We slightly relieve their affliction they will return to unbelief. But on that day We will inflict on them the sternest punishment and avenge Ourself.
p. 191 Evil has become rife on land and sea as a result of man¹s misdeeds. Allah has ordained it thus for men, so that they may taste the fruit of their own works and mend their ways.
p. 218 Yet men have divided themselves into different sects, each rejoicing in its own doctrines. Leave them in their error till death overtakes them.
p. 220 Requite evil with good. We are fully aware of all their slanders. And say: ³Lord, I seek refuge in You from the promptings of the devils. . . .
p. 221 Say: ³Lord, forgive and have mercy; You are the best of those that show mercy.²
p. 243 Say: ³My Lord has forbidden all indecent acts, whether overt or disguised, sin, and wrongful oppression. . . .
p. 248 ³Do not squat in every road, threatening believers and debarring them from the path of Allah, nor seek to make that path crooked.
p. 256 Most excellent are the names of Allah. Call on Him by His names and keep away from those that pervert them. They shall be punished for their misdeeds.
p. 266 Intrigue is the work of Satan, who thereby seeks to annoy the faithful.

Allah wants all men to be united in His will:
p. 152 Allah is our Lord and your Lord. We [the Gods] have our own works and you have yours; let there be no argument between us. Allah will bring us all together, for to Him we shall return.²
p. 158 Requite evil with good, and he who is your enemy will become your dearest friend. But none will attain this save those who endure with fortitude and are greatly favoured by Allah.
p. 417 We sent forth apostles before you to other nations, and afflicted them with calamities and misfortunes so that they might humble themselves.
http://www.greaterthings.com/News/911/Koran_War_Peace/partII.htm

B
Socialist Worker 1939, 19 February 2005 (www.socialistworker.co.uk)

Fallujah: the truth at last
Doctor Salam Ismael took aid to Fallujah last month — this is his story of how the US murdered a city
IT WAS the smell that first hit me, a smell that is difficult to describe, and one that will never leave me. It was the smell of death. Hundreds of corpses were decomposing in the houses, gardens and streets of Fallujah. Bodies were rotting where they had fallen—bodies of men, women and children, many half-eaten by wild dogs.
A wave of hate had wiped out two-thirds of the town, destroying houses and mosques, schools and clinics. This was the terrible and frightening power of the US military assault.
The accounts I heard over the next few days will live with me forever. You may think you know what happened in Fallujah. But the truth is worse than you could possibly have imagined.
In Saqlawiya, one of the makeshift refugee camps that surround Fallujah, we found a 17 year old woman. “I am Hudda Fawzi Salam Issawi from the Jolan district of Fallujah,” she told me. “Five of us, including a 55 year old neighbour, were trapped together in our house in Fallujah when the siege began.
“On 9 November American marines came to our house. My father and the neighbour went to the door to meet them. We were not fighters. We thought we had nothing to fear. I ran into the kitchen to put on my veil, since men were going to enter our house and it would be wrong for them to see me with my hair uncovered.
“This saved my life. As my father and neighbour approached the door, the Americans opened fire on them. They died instantly.
“Me and my 13 year old brother hid in the kitchen behind the fridge. The soldiers came into the house and caught my older sister. They beat her. Then they shot her. But they did not see me. Soon they left, but not before they had destroyed our furniture and stolen the money from my father’s pocket.”
Hudda told me how she comforted her dying sister by reading verses from the Koran. After four hours her sister died. For three days Hudda and her brother stayed with their murdered relatives. But they were thirsty and had only a few dates to eat. They feared the troops would return and decided to try to flee the city. But they were spotted by a US sniper.
Hudda was shot in the leg, her brother ran but was shot in the back and died instantly. “I prepared myself to die,” she told me. “But I was found by an American woman soldier, and she took me to hospital.” She was eventually reunited with the surviving members of her family.
I also found survivors of another family from the Jolan district. They told me that at the end of the second week of the siege the US troops swept through the Jolan. The Iraqi National Guard
used loudspeakers to call on people to get out of the houses carrying white flags, bringing all their belongings with them. They were ordered to gather outside near the Jamah al-Furkan mosque in the centre of town.
On 12 November Eyad Naji Latif and eight members of his family—one of them a six month old child—gathered their belongings and walked in single file, as instructed, to the mosque.
When they reached the main road outside the mosque they heard a shout, but they could not understand what was being shouted. Eyad told me it could have been “now” in English. Then the firing began.
US soldiers appeared on the roofs of surrounding houses and opened fire. Eyad’s father was shot in the heart and his mother in the chest.
They died instantly. Two of Eyad’s brothers were also hit, one in the chest and one in the neck. Two of the women were hit, one in the hand and one in the leg.
Then the snipers killed the wife of one of Eyad’s brothers. When she fell her five year old son ran to her and stood over her body. They shot him dead too.
Survivors made desperate appeals to the troops to stop firing.
But Eyad told me that whenever one of them tried to raise a white flag they were shot. After several hours he tried to raise his arm with the flag. But they shot him in the arm. Finally he tried to raise his hand. So they shot him in the hand.
The five survivors, including the six month old child, lay in the street for seven hours. Then four of them crawled to the nearest home to find shelter.
The next morning the brother who was shot in the neck also managed to crawl to safety. They all stayed in the house for eight days, surviving on roots and one cup of water, which they saved for the baby.
On the eighth day they were discovered by some members of the Iraqi National Guard and taken to hospital in Fallujah. They heard the Americans were arresting any young men, so the family fled the hospital and finally obtained treatment in a nearby town.
They do not know in detail what happened to the other families who had gone to the mosque as instructed. But they told me the street was awash with blood.
I had come to Fallujah in January as part of a humanitarian aid convoy funded by donations from Britain.
Our small convoy of trucks and vans brought 15 tons of flour, eight tons of rice, medical aid and 900 pieces of clothing for the orphans. We knew that thousands of refugees were camped in terrible conditions in four camps on the outskirts of town.
There we heard the accounts of families killed in their houses, of wounded people dragged into the streets and run over by tanks, of a container with the bodies of 481 civilians inside, of premeditated murder, looting and acts of savagery and cruelty that beggar belief.
Through the ruins
That is why we decided to go into Fallujah and investigate. When we entered the town I almost did not recognise the place where I had worked as a doctor in April 2004, during the first siege.
We found people wandering like ghosts through the ruins. Some were looking for the bodies of relatives. Others were trying to recover some of their possessions from destroyed homes.
Here and there, small knots of people were queuing for fuel or food. In one queue some of the survivors were fighting over a blanket.
I remember being approached by an elderly woman, her eyes raw with tears. She grabbed my arm and told me how her house had been hit by a US bomb during an air raid. The ceiling collapsed on her 19 year old son, cutting off both his legs.
She could not get help. She could not go into the streets because the Americans had posted snipers on the roofs and were killing anyone who ventured out, even at night.
She tried her best to stop the bleeding, but it was to no avail. She stayed with him, her only son, until he died. He took four hours to die.
Fallujah’s main hospital was seized by the US troops in the first days of the siege. The only other clinic, the Hey Nazzal, was hit twice by US missiles. Its medicines and medical equipment were all destroyed.
There were no ambulances—the two ambulances that came to help the wounded were shot up and destroyed by US troops.
We visited houses in the Jolan district, a poor working class area in the north western part of the city that had been the centre of resistance during the April siege.
This quarter seemed to have been singled out for punishment during the second siege. We moved from house to house, discovering families dead in their beds, or cut down in living rooms or in the kitchen. House after house had furniture smashed and possessions scattered.
In some places we found bodies of fighters, dressed in black and with ammunition belts.
But in most of the houses, the bodies were of civilians. Many were dressed in housecoats, many of the women were not veiled—meaning there were no men other than family members in the house. There were no weapons, no spent cartridges.
It became clear to us that we were witnessing the aftermath of a massacre, the cold-blooded butchery of helpless and defenceless civilians.
Nobody knows how many died. The occupation forces are now bulldozing the neighbourhoods to cover up their crime. What happened in Fallujah was an act of barbarity. The whole world must be told the truth.

http://www.socialistworker.co.uk/print_article.php4?article_id=5891)

C
United Nations S/RES/1441 (2002)
Security Council Distr.: General
8 November 2002
02-68226 (E)
*0268226*

Resolution 1441 (2002)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4644th meeting, on
8 November 2002

The Security Council,
Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions, in particular its resolutions 661
(1990) of 6 August 1990, 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990, 686 (1991) of 2 March
1991, 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, 688 (1991) of 5 April 1991, 707 (1991) of 15
August 1991, 715 (1991) of 11 October 1991, 986 (1995) of 14 April 1995, and
1284 (1999) of 17 December 1999, and all the relevant statements of its President,
Recalling also its resolution 1382 (2001) of 29 November 2001 and its
intention to implement it fully,
Recognizing the threat Iraq’s non-compliance with Council resolutions and
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles poses to
international peace and security,
Recalling that its resolution 678 (1990) authorized Member States to use all
necessary means to uphold and implement its resolution 660 (1990) of 2 August
1990 and all relevant resolutions subsequent to resolution 660 (1990) and to restore
international peace and security in the area,
Further recalling that its resolution 687 (1991) imposed obligations on Iraq as
a necessary step for achievement of its stated objective of restoring international
peace and security in the area,
Deploring the fact that Iraq has not provided an accurate, full, final, and
complete disclosure, as required by resolution 687 (1991), of all aspects of its
programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a
range greater than one hundred and fifty rigins li, and of all holdings of such
weapons, their components and production facilities and locations, as well as all
other nuclear programmes, including any which it claims are for purposes not
related to nuclear-weapons-usable material,
Deploring further that Iraq repeatedly obstructed immediate, unconditional,
and unrestricted access to sites designated by the United Nations Special
Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
failed to cooperate fully and unconditionally with UNSCOM and IAEA weapons
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inspectors, as required by resolution 687 (1991), and ultimately ceased all
cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA in 1998,
Deploring the absence, since December 1998, in Iraq of international
monitoring, inspection, and verification, as required by relevant resolutions, of
weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, in spite of the Council’s repeated
demands that Iraq provide immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to the
United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC),
established in resolution 1284 (1999) as the successor organization to UNSCOM,
and the IAEA, and regretting the consequent prolonging of the crisis in the region
and the suffering of the Iraqi people,
Deploring also that the Government of Iraq has failed to comply with its
commitments pursuant to resolution 687 (1991) with regard to terrorism, pursuant to
resolution 688 (1991) to end repression of its civilian population and to provide
access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance
in Iraq, and pursuant to resolutions 686 (1991), 687 (1991), and 1284 (1999) to
return or cooperate in accounting for Kuwaiti and third country nationals wrongfully
detained by Iraq, or to return Kuwaiti property wrongfully seized by Iraq,
Recalling that in its resolution 687 (1991) the Council declared that a ceasefire
would be based on acceptance by Iraq of the provisions of that resolution, including
the obligations on Iraq contained therein,
Determined to ensure full and immediate compliance by Iraq without
conditions or restrictions with its obligations under resolution 687 (1991) and other
relevant resolutions and recalling that the resolutions of the Council constitute the
governing standard of Iraqi compliance,
Recalling that the effective operation of UNMOVIC, as the successor
organization to the Special Commission, and the IAEA is essential for the
implementation of resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions,
Noting that the letter dated 16 September 2002 from the Minister for Foreign
Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General is a necessary first step toward
rectifying Iraq’s continued failure to comply with relevant Council resolutions,
Noting further the letter dated 8 October 2002 from the Executive Chairman of
UNMOVIC and the Director-General of the IAEA to General Al-Saadi of the
Government of Iraq laying out the practical arrangements, as a follow-up to their
meeting in Vienna, that are prerequisites for the resumption of inspections in Iraq by
UNMOVIC and the IAEA, and expressing the gravest concern at the continued
failure by the Government of Iraq to provide confirmation of the arrangements as
laid out in that letter,
Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Iraq, Kuwait, and the neighbouring States,
Commending the Secretary-General and members of the League of Arab States
and its Secretary-General for their efforts in this regard,
Determined to secure full compliance with its decisions,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
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1. Decides that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its
obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687 (1991), in particular
through Iraq’s failure to cooperate with United Nations inspectors and the IAEA,
and to complete the actions required under paragraphs 8 to 13 of resolution 687
(1991);
2. Decides, while acknowledging paragraph 1 above, to afford Iraq, by this
resolution, a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under
relevant resolutions of the Council; and accordingly decides to set up an enhanced
inspection regime with the aim of bringing to full and verified completion the
disarmament process established by resolution 687 (1991) and subsequent
resolutions of the Council;
3. Decides that, in order to begin to comply with its disarmament
obligations, in addition to submitting the required biannual declarations, the
Government of Iraq shall provide to UNMOVIC, the IAEA, and the Council, not
later than 30 days from the date of this resolution, a currently accurate, full, and
complete declaration of all aspects of its programmes to develop chemical,
biological, and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other delivery systems such
as unmanned aerial vehicles and dispersal systems designed for use on aircraft,
including any holdings and precise locations of such weapons, components, subcomponents,
stocks of agents, and related material and equipment, the locations and
work of its research, development and production facilities, as well as all other
chemical, biological, and nuclear programmes, including any which it claims are for
purposes not related to weapon production or material;
4. Decides that false statements or omissions in the declarations submitted
by Iraq pursuant to this resolution and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with,
and cooperate fully in the implementation of, this resolution shall constitute a
further material breach of Iraq’s obligations and will be reported to the Council for
assessment in accordance with paragraphs 11 and 12 below;
5. Decides that Iraq shall provide UNMOVIC and the IAEA immediate,
unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access to any and all, including
underground, areas, facilities, buildings, equipment, records, and means of transport
which they wish to inspect, as well as immediate, unimpeded, unrestricted, and
private access to all officials and other persons whom UNMOVIC or the IAEA wish
to interview in the mode or location of UNMOVIC’s or the IAEA’s choice pursuant
to any aspect of their mandates; further decides that UNMOVIC and the IAEA may
at their discretion conduct interviews inside or outside of Iraq, may facilitate the
travel of those interviewed and family members outside of Iraq, and that, at the sole
discretion of UNMOVIC and the IAEA, such interviews may occur without the
presence of observers from the Iraqi Government; and instructs UNMOVIC and
requests the IAEA to resume inspections no later than 45 days following adoption of
this resolution and to update the Council 60 days thereafter;
6. Endorses the 8 October 2002 letter from the Executive Chairman of
UNMOVIC and the Director-General of the IAEA to General Al-Saadi of the
Government of Iraq, which is annexed hereto, and decides that the contents of the
letter shall be binding upon Iraq;
7. Decides further that, in view of the prolonged interruption by Iraq of the
presence of UNMOVIC and the IAEA and in order for them to accomplish the tasks
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set forth in this resolution and all previous relevant resolutions and notwithstanding
prior understandings, the Council hereby establishes the following revised or
additional authorities, which shall be binding upon Iraq, to facilitate their work in
Iraq:
1. UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall determine the composition of their inspection
teams and ensure that these teams are composed of the most qualified and
experienced experts available;
1. All UNMOVIC and IAEA personnel shall enjoy the privileges and immunities,
corresponding to those of experts on mission, provided in the Convention on
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations and the Agreement on the
Privileges and Immunities of the IAEA;
1. UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have unrestricted rights of entry into and out
of Iraq, the right to free, unrestricted, and immediate movement to and from
inspection sites, and the right to inspect any sites and buildings, including
immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access to Presidential
Sites equal to that at other sites, notwithstanding the provisions of resolution
1154 (1998) of 2 March 1998;
1. UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right to be provided by Iraq the
names of all personnel currently and formerly associated with Iraq’s chemical,
biological, nuclear, and ballistic missile programmes and the associated
research, development, and production facilities;
1. Security of UNMOVIC and IAEA facilities shall be ensured by sufficient
United Nations security guards;
1. UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right to declare, for the purposes of
freezing a site to be inspected, exclusion zones, including surrounding areas
and transit corridors, in which Iraq will suspend ground and aerial movement
so that nothing is changed in or taken out of a site being inspected;
1. UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the free and unrestricted use and landing
of fixed- and rotary-winged aircraft, including manned and unmanned
reconnaissance vehicles;
1. UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right at their sole discretion verifiably
to remove, destroy, or render harmless all prohibited weapons, subsystems,
components, records, materials, and other related items, and the right to
impound or close any facilities or equipment for the production thereof; and
1. UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right to free import and use of
equipment or materials for inspections and to seize and export any equipment,
materials, or documents taken during inspections, without search of
UNMOVIC or IAEA personnel or official or personal baggage;
8. Decides further that Iraq shall not take or threaten hostile acts directed
against any representative or personnel of the United Nations or the IAEA or of any
Member State taking action to uphold any Council resolution;
9. Requests the Secretary-General immediately to notify Iraq of this
resolution, which is binding on Iraq; demands that Iraq confirm within seven days of
that notification its intention to comply fully with this resolution; and demands
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further that Iraq cooperate immediately, unconditionally, and actively with
UNMOVIC and the IAEA;
10. Requests all Member States to give full support to UNMOVIC and the
IAEA in the discharge of their mandates, including by providing any information
related to prohibited programmes or other aspects of their mandates, including on
Iraqi attempts since 1998 to acquire prohibited items, and by recommending sites to
be inspected, persons to be interviewed, conditions of such interviews, and data to
be collected, the results of which shall be reported to the Council by UNMOVIC and
the IAEA;
11. Directs the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director-General
of the IAEA to report immediately to the Council any interference by Iraq with
inspection activities, as well as any failure by Iraq to comply with its disarmament
obligations, including its obligations regarding inspections under this resolution;
12. Decides to convene immediately upon receipt of a report in accordance
with paragraphs 4 or 11 above, in order to consider the situation and the need for
full compliance with all of the relevant Council resolutions in order to secure
international peace and security;
13. Recalls, in that context, that the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that
it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its
obligations;
14. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
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Annex
Text of Blix/El-Baradei letter
United Nations Monitoring, Verification
and Inspection Commission
The Executive Chairman
International Atomic Energy Agency
The Director General
8 October 2002
Dear General Al-Saadi,
During our recent meeting in Vienna, we discussed practical arrangements that are prerequisites for the
resumption of inspections in Iraq by UNMOVIC and the IAEA. As you recall, at the end of our meeting in
Vienna we agreed on a statement which listed some of the principal results achieved, particularly Iraq’s
acceptance of all the rights of inspection provided for in all of the relevant Security Council resolutions. This
acceptance was stated to be without any conditions attached.
During our 3 October 2002 briefing to the Security Council, members of the Council suggested that we
prepare a written document on all of the conclusions we reached in Vienna. This letter lists those conclusions and
seeks your confirmation thereof. We shall report accordingly to the Security Council.
In the statement at the end of the meeting, it was clarified that UNMOVIC and the IAEA will be granted
immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to sites, including what was termed “sensitive sites” in the past.
As we noted, however, eight presidential sites have been the subject of special procedures under a Memorandum
of Understanding of 1998. Should these sites be subject, as all other sites, to immediate, unconditional and
unrestricted access, UNMOVIC and the IAEA would conduct inspections there with the same professionalism.
H.E. General Amir H. Al-Saadi
Advisor
Presidential Office
Baghdad
Iraq
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We confirm our understanding that UNMOVIC and the IAEA have the right to determine the number of
inspectors required for access to any particular site. This determination will be made on the basis of the size and
complexity of the site being inspected. We also confirm that Iraq will be informed of the designation of additional
sites, i.e. sites not declared by Iraq or previously inspected by either UNSCOM or the IAEA, through a
Notification of Inspection (NIS) provided upon arrival of the inspectors at such sites.
Iraq will ensure that no proscribed material, equipment, records or other relevant items will be destroyed
except in the presence of UNMOVIC and/or IAEA inspectors, as appropriate, and at their request.
UNMOVIC and the IAEA may conduct interviews with any person in Iraq whom they believe may have
information relevant to their mandate. Iraq will facilitate such interviews. It is for UNMOVIC and the IAEA to
choose the mode and location for interviews.
The National Monitoring Directorate (NMD) will, as in the past, serve as the Iraqi counterpart for the
inspectors. The Baghdad Ongoing Monitoring and Verification Centre (BOMVIC) will be maintained on the same
premises and under the same conditions as was the former Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre. The
NMD will make available services as before, cost free, for the refurbishment of the premises.
The NMD will provide free of cost: (a) escorts to facilitate access to sites to be inspected and
communication with personnel to be interviewed; (b) a hotline for BOMVIC which will be staffed by an English
speaking person on a 24 hour a day/seven days a week basis; © support in terms of personnel and ground
transportation within the country, as requested; and (d) assistance in the movement of materials and equipment at
inspectors’ request (construction, excavation equipment, etc.). NMD will also ensure that escorts are available in
the event of inspections outside normal working hours, including at night and on holidays.
Regional UNMOVIC/IAEA offices may be established, for example, in Basra and Mosul, for the use of their
inspectors. For this purpose, Iraq will provide, without cost, adequate office buildings, staff accommodation, and
appropriate escort personnel.
UNMOVIC and the IAEA may use any type of voice or data transmission, including satellite and/or inland
networks, with or without encryption capability. UNMOVIC and the IAEA may also install equipment in the field
with the capability for transmission of data directly to the BOMVIC, New York and Vienna (e.g. sensors,
surveillance cameras). This will be facilitated by Iraq and there will be no interference by Iraq with UNMOVIC
or IAEA communications.
Iraq will provide, without cost, physical protection of all surveillance equipment, and construct antennae for
remote transmission of data, at the request of UNMOVIC and the IAEA. Upon request by UNMOVIC through the
NMD, Iraq will allocate frequencies for communications equipment.
Iraq will provide security for all UNMOVIC and IAEA personnel. Secure and suitable accommodations will
be designated at normal rates by Iraq for these personnel. For their part, UNMOVIC and the IAEA will require
that their staff not stay at any accommodation other than those identified in consultation with Iraq.
On the use of fixed-wing aircraft for transport of personnel and equipment and for inspection purposes, it
was clarified that aircraft used by UNMOVIC and IAEA staff arriving in Baghdad may land at Saddam
International Airport. The points of departure of incoming aircraft will be decided by UNMOVIC. The Rasheed
airbase will continue to be used for UNMOVIC and IAEA helicopter operations. UNMOVIC and Iraq will
establish air liaison offices at the airbase. At both Saddam International Airport and Rasheed airbase, Iraq will
provide the necessary support premises and facilities. Aircraft fuel will be provided by Iraq, as before, free of
charge.
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On the wider issue of air operations in Iraq, both fixed-wing and rotary, Iraq will guarantee the safety of air
operations in its air space outside the no-fly zones. With regard to air operations in the no-fly zones, Iraq will take
all steps within its control to ensure the safety of such operations.
Helicopter flights may be used, as needed, during inspections and for technical activities, such as gamma
detection, without limitation in all parts of Iraq and without any area excluded. Helicopters may also be used for
medical evacuation.
On the question of aerial imagery, UNMOVIC may wish to resume the use of U-2 or Mirage overflights.
The relevant practical arrangements would be similar to those implemented in the past.
As before, visas for all arriving staff will be issued at the point of entry on the basis of the UN Laissez-
Passer or UN Certificate; no other entry or exit formalities will be required. The aircraft passenger manifest will
be provided one hour in advance of the arrival of the aircraft in Baghdad. There will be no searching of
UNMOVIC or IAEA personnel or of official or personal baggage. UNMOVIC and the IAEA will ensure that their
personnel respect the laws of Iraq restricting the export of certain items, for example, those related to Iraq’s
national cultural heritage. UNMOVIC and the IAEA may bring into, and remove from, Iraq all of the items and
materials they require, including satellite phones and other equipment. With respect to samples, UNMOVIC and
IAEA will, where feasible, split samples so that Iraq may receive a portion while another portion is kept for
reference purposes. Where appropriate, the organizations will send the samples to more than one laboratory for
analysis.
We would appreciate your confirmation of the above as a correct reflection of our talks in Vienna.
Naturally, we may need other practical arrangements when proceeding with inspections. We would expect in
such matters, as with the above, Iraq’s co-operation in all respect.
Yours sincerely,
(Signed) (Signed)
Hans Blix Mohamed ElBaradei
Executive Chairman Director General
United Nations Monitoring, International Atomic Energy Agency
Verification and Inspection Commission

D

From Encyclopedia of Politics and Religion, ed. Robert Wuthnow. 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1998), 425-426.
Jihad
The Islamic idea of jihad, which is derived from the Arabic root meaning “to strive” or “to make an effort,” connotes a wide range of meanings, from an inward spiritual struggle to attain perfect faith to an outward material struggle to promote justice and the Islamic social system. The former meaning was emphasized by Sufis (Muslim mystics), who rigins lis a tradition describing the inner jihad as greater than the outer jihad. When used in the latter sense, jihad is closely identified with the injunction in the Qur’an, the revelation of God to the prophet Muhammad, to the Muslim community to “command the right and forbid the wrong” (3:104, 110). The close connection of jihad with the struggle for justice is reinforced in the hadith, the sayings and actions attributed to Muhammad. One of the best known states that a Muslim must strive to avert injustice first by actions, and if that is not possible, by words, and if that is not possible, at least by intentions.
During the period of Qur’anic revelation while Muhammad was in Mecca (610-622), jihad meant essentially a rigins lis struggle to spread Islam. Following his move from Mecca to Medina in 622, and the establishment of an Islamic state, fighting in self-defense was sanctioned by the Qur’an (22:39). The Qur’an began referring increasingly to qital (fighting or warfare) as one form of jihad. Two of the last verses on this topic (9:5, 29) suggest a war of conquest or conversion against all unbelievers.
The Medieval Doctrine
In medieval legal sources (compiled roughly between the eighth and eleventh centuries), jihad generally referred to a divinely sanctioned struggle to establish Muslim hegemony over non-Muslims as a prelude to the propagation of the Islamic faith. Islamic legal scholars divided the world into two spheres: Dar al-Islam (land of Islam), where Islamic law applied, and Dar al-Harb (land of war), where the absence of Islamic law presumably fostered anarchy and immorality. The Islamic state’s duty was to reduce Dar al-Harb—through peaceful means if possible, through war if necessary—until it had been incorporated into Dar al-Islam. Jurists differed on the possibility and duration of peace between the two spheres. The majority held that jihad could be suspended if the Muslim commander deemed it in the interest of the Islamic state, but usually not for more than ten years. The Qur’anic verses that suggest peaceful accommodation or coexistence with unbelievers (especially 2:193, 8:61) were declared abrogated by the later, more belligerent ones.
The medieval theory included elaborate rules on the right conduct of jihad. No war was a jihad unless authorized and led by the imam, the leader of the Islamic state. Enemies were to be given fair warning, and, should they choose not to accept Islam or to fight, they were to be offered protected (dhimmi) status, which allowed them to retain communal autonomy within the Islamic state in return for tax payments. This provision initially applied to Christians and Jews but later was broadened to include other religious communities living under Muslim rule. Noncombatants were not to be killed, nor was enemy property to be destroyed unnecessarily.
In addition to the expansionist jihad, medieval scholars also dealt with internal conflicts against rebels within Islam. In this form of jihad, stricter rules of engagement and greater protection for the lives and property of the enemy applied than in the case of non-Muslims. The aim of this type of jihad was to rehabilitate the rebels as quickly as possible into the Muslim body politic.
Modern Interpretations
Three broad approaches to the modern reinterpretation of jihad may be discerned. First, the apologetic arose in the late nineteenth century in response to Western criticism that jihad meant “holy war” and that Islam was spread through force. Muslim apologists argued that the Qur’an and Prophetic traditions allow war only for self-defense against persecution and aggression. Some Muslim writers, particularly those in British India, restricted even further the legitimate scope of jihad by arguing that so long as no direct threat to Islamic worship was posed by European imperialists Muslims should not challenge colonial rule. The medieval theorists who had defined jihad as expansionist war were, according to this view, simply misguided.
The second approach, the modernist, also diminishes jihad’s military aspects and emphasizes its broader ethical dimensions within Islamic faith and practice. Like the apologists, the modernists dismiss the medieval theory as a distortion of Qur’anic ethics, pointing out, for example, that the division of the world into Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb is found nowhere in the Qur’an or Prophetic traditions. A war is jihad, therefore, only if it is fought in defense of Muslim lives, property, and honor. Unlike the apologists, however, the modernists are motivated less by Western criticisms of jihad than by the desire to interpret this concept in a way compatible with modern international norms. Jihad in the modernist view is the Islamic equivalent of the Western idea of just war, a war fought to repel aggression with limited goals and by restricted means.
The third approach, the revivalist, arose in response to the apologist and modernist writings. By limiting jihad to self-defense, the revivalists claim, the apologists and modernists have debased the dynamic qualities of jihad. In the final years of the Prophet’s life, the revivalists argue, jihad clearly meant the struggle to propagate the Islamic order worldwide. The goal of jihad today ought not to be to coerce people to accept Islam, because the Qur’an clearly encourages freedom of worship (especially 2:256); rather, it ought to be to overthrow un-Islamic regimes that corrupt their societies and divert people from service to God.
For revivalist writers, un-Islamic regimes include those ruling in most Muslim countries. The immediate goal of the revivalist jihad is to replace hypocritical leaders with true Muslims. Only when this long and painstaking internal struggle has succeeded in rigins lishing an authentically Islamic base can the external jihad resume. Thus jihad is today largely synonymous with Islamic revolution in the works of most Muslim activists.
See also Crusades; Islam; Muhammad; Sufism; Violence; War.
Author: Sohail H. Hashmi
Bibliography
Hamidullah, Muhammad. Muslim Conduct of State. 7th ed. Lahore: Shaykh Muhammad Ashraf, 1961.
Johnson, James Turner, and John Kelsay, eds. Cross, Crescent, and Sword: The Justification and Limitation of War in Western and Islamic Tradition. New York: Greenwood Press, 1990.
Kelsay, John, and James Turner Johnson, eds. Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Tradition. New York: Greenwood Press, 1991.
Khadduri, Majid. War and Peace in the Law of Islam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1955.
Morabia, Alfred. Le Gihad dans l’Islam medieval: Le “Combat sacre” des rigins au XIIe siecle. Paris: Albin Michel, 1993.
Peters, Rudolph. Islam and Colonialism: The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History. The Hague: Mouton, 1979.
Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam. Princeton: Markus Wiener, 1996.
© 2001 Congressional Quarterly, Inc. All rights reserved.

E

Al-Qaeda : The 39 principles of Holy War
By Joel Leyden – Israel News Agency
4 September 2003

Following are the 39 principles of Jihad as described by Al-Qaeda in Al-salem’s book:
1. Preparing and urging the mind for Jihad – Every Muslim must obey the call for the Jihad against the infidels out of sheer belief and intention.
2. Sincere desire to attain martyrdom – Al-Salem, basing his arguments on Sheik Abdallah Azzam (the spiritual leader of Osama Bin Laden, killed in Afghanistan in 1989), emphasizes the importance of the sincere endeavor in
order to attain martyrdom from Allah. The believer can perform the commandment concerning the “preparation to the battle” (I’dad Al-‘oda) and gain a reward from Allah equivalent to the Saheed’s reward (72 virgins and secure a close place near the Divine presence in Heaven) even though he may die from natural causes.
3. Taking part in the Jihad – Every Muslim has to take an active role in holy war against the infidels, prepared to self sacrifice for the sake of Allah. Participation in Jihad is the most distinguished action in the eyes of Allah.
4. Financing Jihad – Muslims can take part in the Jihad by making donations dedicated to the Jihad and the Mujahideen. The donation’s value is determined by its quality and destination and not by the sum total which is
donated.
5. Supplying the fighters’ needs – A believer who is unable to take part in the Jihad (for instance women and handicapped) can perform his duty by supplying the Mujahideens’ needs in money and equipment. By doing so the
donator is considered Mujahid and deserves the same reward.
6. Taking care of the Mujahid’s family – A believer who supplies a Mujahid’s family needs is considered Mujahid and deserves half of his reward. If one neglects this act it may bring him misfortune and death by the hands of God.
7. Assisting the fallens’ families – by supplying the special needs of the orphans and widows.
8. Assisting the families of prisoners and wounded fighters – by supplying their necessities.
9. Fund raising for the Mujahideen – money is the lifeline of the Jihad. Its importance also stems from gathering donations which would arouse the spirit of Jihad in the believers’ hearts. There are many ways of carrying out this duty: in mosques, public places, family gatherings, charity events, monthly donation or by urging the wealthy to open their
hands to the Mujahideen.
10. Granting charity donations to the Mujahideens – who enjoy priority
status in Islam.
11. Financing medical treatment for wounded Mujahideen
12. Praising the Mujahideen and their deeds – It is essential to educate the
Islamic Nation on their values and to see them as a role model.
13. Encouraging the Mujahideen to stick to their ways – in order to
strengthen their spirit and moral.
14. Protecting the Mujahideen –avoid publishing any information that may place them in jeopardy or spoil the spirit of Jihad. Al-Salem warns his readers from the Arabic daily Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (Saudi orientated, published in London) which conducts the “crusader – Jewish scheme” against Islam by publishing false information designed to destroy the steadfastness of the Islamic Nation and the Mujahideens’ spirit.
15. Publicizing the disgrace of hypocrites and defeatists – who strive to weaken the Islamic Nation.
16. Preaching to Jihad – Enormous reward is promised to every Muslim who serves as a catalyst for other believers to commit the duty of the Jihad.
17. Providing strategic advice to the Mujahideen – This can be translated in many ways including the supply of essential information on the enemy and his plans in order to be well prepared.
18. Keeping secrecy concerning the Mujahideen
19. Prayers to Allah for the sake of the Mujahideen and for the defeat of
the enemies.
20. Holding special prayer to avoid misfortune and to strengthen the Muslim community.
21. Publishing the Mujahideens’ activities in order to arouse the notion of solidarity and strengthen pride and hope among the believers, to praise the ideal of self sacrifice for the sake of Allah and to break the media siege
imposed by the enemy. There are varied ways recommended for distributing information praising Jihad including Internet websites and forums, distribution lists, circulating publications in public places (for instance mosques, schools), sending SMS, etc.
22. Participating in the publishing process of books on the Mujahideen
23. Publishing Islamic laws supporting the Jihad – This mission falls on the shoulders of the Muslim scholars who have the duty to guide the Islamic Nation in the light of the Jihad and to call believers to join the Mujahideen and pray on their behalf. Their followers are demanded to urge the scholars to act. In this context, Al-Salem glorifies the role of Sheik Hamoud Al-Oqala Al-Shu’aybi (radical Saudi scholar, deceased 2 years ago, backed the Taliban regime and al-Qaeda) as an adorable scholar who thrived to strengthen the Jihadi organizations worldwide by publishing Islamic laws justifying terror suicide attacks and holy war against the infidels.
24. Keeping steady, consistent contact with scholars and preachers in order to update them about the current happenings in connection with the Mujahideen. The believer is asked to assist Islamic scholars who on certain
occasion are under government pressure or influenced by false information. He has to update them regularly with reliable information, to support them and urge them to persist with the call to Jihad.
25. Physical practicing – A Muslim who designates himself to become a Mujaheed has to start gradually by improving his physical fitness. Al-Salem elaborates in his book a recommended practicing program which includes
enhancing the endurance of both the heart and lungs, increasing muscle mass and strength.
26. Acquiring shooting skills – Al-Salem calls on Muslims not to be satisfied solely with the tuition of Jihad but to prepare in performing in this duty by acquiring shooting skills.
27. Practicing swimming and riding horses – riding horses, explains Al-Salem is still relevant in the battlefields of Afghanistan, Chechnya and Iraq.
28. Learning first aid skills – to help wounded Mujahudeen (splicing broken bones, providing infusions, etc.).
29. Learning the doctrine of Jihad – Al-Salem recommends dozens of books, articles and Islamic laws published in recent years by Muslim radical leaders and scholars most of them Saudis by origin (Osama Bin Laden, Hamoud
Al-Oqala Al-Shuaibi, Abd Aziz Jarbou’, Yusouf Al-‘ayyiri, Naser Al-Fahed, Ali Al-Khudier, Suliman Al-Olwan and more). One of them is the Al-Khudier’s Islamic law which justifies the use of weapons of mass destruction against
the U.S.
30. Supplying refuge and shelter to the Mujahideen
31. Expressing hostility and hatred toward infidels – A call for reconciliation or co-existence with the infidels might weaken the Mujahudeen. One may call for a Hudna, but to place it in practice is forbidden.
32. Constant action to achieve the release of all prisoners – held in enemy jails and to use all means for their escape or release.
33. Distributing current information on the prisoners in order to keep their high moral.
34. Performing electronic Jihad – Al-Salem attributes paramount importance to the Internet as a component for Jihad. He calls believers to join the Jihad by participating in Internet forums to defend the Islam and Mujahideen, to preach Jihad and to encourage Muslims to learn more about this sacred duty. The Internet provides an opportunity to reach vast, target audiences and respond swiftly to false allegations. Computer experts are asked to use their skills and experience in destroying American, Jewish and secular websites as well as morally corrupt web sites.
35. Alienation of infidels – Believers in other religions have to be isolated from Muslim communities so they will be prevented from committing hostile actions.
36. Educating the younger generation to adore Jihad and the Mujahideen – The children, asserts Al-Salem are the “fuel” of the next stage of confrontation with the infidels. Parents have the duty to educate them to adore Jihad and
the Mujahideen and to prepare themselves mentally for self-sacrifice for the sake of Allah. Al-Salem recommends believers to tell their young stories about the life of Prophet Mohammad, his associates, the great Muslim conquerors and the Mujahideen in our time. In addition it is recommended to display to the children Jihadi films and taped preaches which praise martyrdom.
37. Abandoning the luxuries of materialism – which might weaken the spirit of Jihad.
38. Boycotting enemy’s commodities – as part of the economic Jihad.
39. Avoiding the employment of foreign workers – from enemy countries.

F

Protocol I of the 4th Geneva Convention 1977

Article 44. -Combatants and prisoners of war
3. In order to promote the protection of the civilian population from the effects of hostilities, combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian population while they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack. Recognizing, however, that there are situations in armed conflicts where, owing to the nature of the hostilities an armed combatant cannot so distinguish himself, he shall retain his status as a combatant, provided that, in such situations, he carries his arms openly:
( a ) During each military engagement, and
( b ) During such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is engaged in a military deployment preceding the launching of an attack in which he is to participate.
Acts which comply with the requirements of this paragraph shall not be considered as perfidious within the meaning of Article 37, paragraph 1 ( c ).
4. A combatant who falls into the power of an adverse Party while failing to meet the requirements set forth in the second sentence of paragraph 3 shall forfeit his right to be a prisoner of war, but he shall, nevertheless, be given protections equivalent in all respects to those accorded to prisoners of war by the Third Convention and by this Protocol. This protection includes protections equivalent to those accorded to prisoners of war by the Third Convention in the case where such a person is tried and punished for any offences he has committed.
5. Any combatant who falls into the power of an adverse Party while not engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack shall not forfeit his rights to be a combatant and a prisoner of war by virtue of his prior activities.
(Source: Geneva Convention-Wikipedia, 2005)